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A critical reexamination of default logic, autoepistemic logic, and only knowing

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Computational Logic and Proof Theory (KGC 1993)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 713))

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Abstract

Twelve years of work on nonmonotonic logic has certainly increased our understanding of the area. However, given a problem in which nonmonotonic reasoning is called for, it is far from clear how one should go about modeling the problem using the various approaches. We explore this issue in the context on two of the best-known approaches, Reiter's default logic [Rei80] and Moore's autoepistemic logic [Moo85], as well as two related notions of “only knowing”, due to Halpern and Moses [HM84] and Levesque [Lev90]. In particular, we return to the original technical definitions given in these papers, and examine the extent to which they capture the intuitions they were designed to capture.

Research sponsored in part by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFSC), under Contract F49620-91-C-0080. The United States Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM Almaden Research Center, 650 Harry Road, 95120-6099, San Jose, CA

    Joseph Y. Halpern

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  1. Joseph Y. Halpern
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Georg Gottlob Alexander Leitsch Daniele Mundici

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© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Halpern, J.Y. (1993). A critical reexamination of default logic, autoepistemic logic, and only knowing. In: Gottlob, G., Leitsch, A., Mundici, D. (eds) Computational Logic and Proof Theory. KGC 1993. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 713. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0022551

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0022551

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-57184-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-47943-7

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