Skip to main content
Springer Nature Link
Log in

Investigation of non-repudiation protocols

  • Session 1: Authentication
  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 1996)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1172))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

The paper surveys the state of non-repudiation protocols. A fair non-repudiation protocol should provide an equal protection to the sender and the recipient. A number of current non-repudiation protocols expect the protection from or partly from a Trusted Third Party (TTP). In practice, the sender and the recipient that do not trust each other, do not expect or are not able to find an TTP or a strong TTP in some circumstances. A simultaneous secret exchange protocol seems to be one of efficient solutions without an TTP to prevent entities from denying the transferring (sending or receiving) of certain messages. The secret exchange bit by bit, however, is neither very efficient nor convenient to the sender and the recipient in some cases. We introduce a model and a fair non-repudiation protocol without an TTP. In the protocol, the transferring of the message is split into three parts, a commitment C, a key K and an address for the key. Therefore, without bit by bit exchange, the protocol is more efficient than the existing non-repudiation protocols.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. ISO/IEC DIS 10181-4. Information technology — open systems interconnection — security frameworks in open systems, part 4: Non-repudiation. ISO/IEC JTC1, 1995-04-21.

    Google Scholar 

  2. ISO/IEC CD 13888-3. Information technology — security techniques — non-repudiation — part 3: Using asymmetric techniques. ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 N 1107, 1995-09-21.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Ross J. Anderson. Why cryptosystems fail. Communications of the ACM, 37, No. 11:32–40, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  4. E.F. Brickell, D.M. Gordon, K.S. McCurley, and D.B. Wilson. Fast exponentiation with precomputation. In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '92, LNCS 658, pages 200–207. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Liqun Chen, Dieter Gollmann, Yongfei Han, and Chris Mitchell. Identification protocol. IEEE Transaction on Computer, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Ivan Bjerre Damgård. Practical and provably secure release of a secret and exchange of signatures. J. of Cryptology, 8, No. 4:201–222, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  7. D. Gollmann, Y. Han, and C.J. Mitchell. Redundant integer representations and fast exponentiation. Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 7:135–151, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Y. Han and D. J. Evans. Parallel inference on systolic arrays and neural networks. Parallel Algorithms and Application, 10, No. 1&2:169–175, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Y. Han and D.J. Evans. The simulation of EDC with OCCAM on multitransputer system. In Modelling and Simulation, pages 277–279, York, U. K., 1992. Simulation Councile.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Y. Han and D.J. Evans. Parallel inference algorithms for the connection method on systolic arrays. International Journal of Computer Mathematics, 53:177–188, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Y. Han, D. Gollmann, and C.J. Mitchell. Minimal k-SR representations. In Proceedings of fifth IMA Conference on Cryptography and Coding, LNCS 1025, pages 34–43, Cirencester, U.K. 1995. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Y. Han, D. Gollmann, and C.J. Mitchell. Fast modular exponentiation for RSA on systolic arrays. International Journal of Computer Mathematics, 61, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Yongfei Han. Fast Algorithms for Public Key Cryptography. Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Yongfei Han. An assurance protocol. In IEEE Information Theory and Its application, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  15. T. Johansson. Authentication codes for nontrusting parties obtained from rank metric codes. J. of Cryptology, 6:205–218, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  16. C.H. Lim and P.J. Lee. More flexible exponentiation with precomputation. In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of CRYPTO '94, pages 95–105, Santa Barbara, Ca., 1994. Springer-Verlag, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Roger M. Needham. Denial of service. Communication of the ACM, 37, No. 11:42–46, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  18. T. Okamoto and K. Ohta. How to simultaneously exchange secret by general assumptions. In Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 14–28, Fairfax, Virginia, November, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  19. A. Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM, 22:612–613, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Paul F. Syverson and Paul C. von Oorschot. On unifying some cryptographic protocol logics. In Security and Pravicy. IEEE, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Paul C. van Oorschot. Extending cryptographic logics of belief to key agreement protocols. In Proceedings of 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 232–243, Fairfax, Virginia, 1993. ACM press.

    Google Scholar 

  22. J. Zhou and D. Gollmann. A fair non-repudiation protocol. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy to appear. IEEE, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security Group, Institute of Systems Science, Heng Mui Keng Terrace, 119597, Kent Ridge, Singapore

    Yongfei Han

Authors
  1. Yongfei Han
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Josef Pieprzyk Jennifer Seberry

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Han, Y. (1996). Investigation of non-repudiation protocols. In: Pieprzyk, J., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1172. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0023285

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0023285

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61991-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49583-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation