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Protocols for collusion-secure asymmetric fingerprinting

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  • Complexity Theory II
  • Conference paper
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STACS 97 (STACS 1997)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1200))

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Abstract

In [16] asymmetric fingerprinting of data is presented as a new method of copyright protection. The merchant of the data and each buyer interact in such a way that the buyer gets an individually fingerprinted version of the data, while the merchant does not know the version. If the merchant finds an illegally redistributed version of the data he can trace at least one dishonest buyer even if a collusion of c dishonest buyers created that version. Since the merchant himself never sees the buyers' versions he cannot cast suspicion on some innocent buyers by redistributing appropriate versions.

We present a general construction of an asymmetric fingerprinting scheme based on some arbitrary symmetric fingerprinting scheme. Moreover, we give a construction which is more suitable for broadcast data than the constructions presented in [16].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fachbereich Informatik, Universität des Saarlandes, 66041, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Ingrid Biehl & Bernd Meyer

Authors
  1. Ingrid Biehl
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  2. Bernd Meyer
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Rüdiger Reischuk Michel Morvan

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Biehl, I., Meyer, B. (1997). Protocols for collusion-secure asymmetric fingerprinting. In: Reischuk, R., Morvan, M. (eds) STACS 97. STACS 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1200. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0023476

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0023476

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-62616-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68342-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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