Abstract
This paper presents protocols for Byzantine agreement, i.e. for reliable broadcast, among a set of n players, some of which may be controlled by an adversary. It is well-known that Byzantine agreement is possible if and only if the number of cheaters is less than n/3. In this paper we consider a general adversary that is specified by a set of subsets of the player set (the adversary structure), and any one of these subsets may be corrupted by the adversary. The only condition we need is that no three of these subsets cover the full player set. A result of Hirt and Maurer implies that this condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Byzantine agreement protocol, but the complexity of their protocols is generally exponential in the number of players. The purpose of this paper is to present the first protocol with polynomial message and computation complexity for any (even exponentially large) specification of the adversary structure. This closes a gap in a recent result of Cramer, Damgård and Maurer on applying span programs to secure multi-party computation.
Research supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF), SPP project no. 5003-045293
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
A. Bar-Noy, D. Dolev, C. Dwork, and H. R. Strong. Shifting gears: Changing algorithms on the fly to expedite Byzantine agreement. In Proceedings of the Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 42–51, 1987.
P. Berman, J. A. Garay, and K. J. Perry. Towards optimal distributed consensus (extended abstract). In 30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 410–415. IEEE, 1989.
M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson. Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation. In Proc. 20th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 1–10, 1988.
D. Chaum, C. Crépeau, and I. Damgård. Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols (extended abstract). In Proc. 20th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 11–19, 1988.
R. Cramer, I. Damgård, and U. Maurer. Span programs and general secure multi-party computation, Manuscript, 1998.
D. Dolev, M. J. Fischer, R. Fowler, N. A. Lynch, and H. R. Strong. An efficient algorithm for Byzantine agreement without authentication. Information and Control, 52(3):257–274, March 1982.
M. J. Fischer and N. A. Lynch. A lower bound on the time to assure interactive consistency. Information Processing Letters, 14(4):183–186, 1982.
P. Feldman and S. Micali. Optimal algorithms for Byzantine agreement. In Proc. 20th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 148–161, 1988.
J. A. Garay and Y. Moses. Fully polynomial Byzantine agreement in t + 1 rounds (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 31–41, 1993.
M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. In Proc. 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pages 25–34, August 1997.
L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease. The Byzantine generals problem. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 4(3):382–401, July 1982.
D. Malkhi and M. Reiter. Byzantine quorum systems. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 569–578, 1997.
M. Pease, R. Shostak, and L. Lamport. Reaching agreement in the presence of faults. Journal of the ACM, 27(2):228–234, April 1980.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Fitzi, M., Maurer, U. (1998). Efficient Byzantine agreement secure against general adversaries. In: Kutten, S. (eds) Distributed Computing. DISC 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1499. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0056479
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0056479
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65066-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49693-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive