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Reasoning without minimality

  • Reasoning (Non-monotonic Reasoning, Default Logic, Commonsense Reasoning)
  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
PRICAI’98: Topics in Artificial Intelligence (PRICAI 1998)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1531))

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Abstract

Various forms of non-monotonic reasoning thrive on minimal change in some form or other. In general, the principle of minimal change prescribes choosing the best from a given set of alternatives. A dual of this principle, which has not drawn much attention from the researchers in the field, is to reject the worst from a given set of alternatives instead. This paper explores the use of this principle in the context of belief revision, which has known connections with plausible reasoning. Apart from arguing that the suggested operation is not excessively weak, we provide a set of “revision postulates” that demonstrably characterises this “non minimal” belief revision operation.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Systems Group School of Management, University of Newcastle, 2308, NSW, Australia

    Abhaya Nayak

  2. Knowledge Systems Group School of Computer Sci. & Eng., University of New South Wales, 2052, Sydney, Australia

    Norman Foo

Authors
  1. Abhaya Nayak
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  2. Norman Foo
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Editor information

Hing-Yan Lee Hiroshi Motoda

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© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Nayak, A., Foo, N. (1998). Reasoning without minimality. In: Lee, HY., Motoda, H. (eds) PRICAI’98: Topics in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg . https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0095263

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0095263

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65271-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49461-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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