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An anonymous and undeniable payment scheme

  • Session 16: Electronic Commerce
  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information and Communications Security (ICICS 1997)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1334))

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Abstract

At Asiacrypt 1996, M'Raihi presented an electronic payment scheme using a blinding office to achieve anonymity. This scheme allows both a bank and a blinding office to impersonate a user without being detected. It may result in a denial problem where the user can deny his bad behaviour by suggesting that either the bank or the blinding office did wrong. This paper proposes a variant of the M'Raihi scheme to prevent the bank and blinding office from impersonating the user, so that the user cannot deny it if he abuses a coin himself.

Part of the first author's work was funded by the European Commission under ACTS project AC095 (ASPeCT) when she worked in Royal Holloway, University of London.

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References

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Authors

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Yongfei Han Tatsuaki Okamoto Sihan Qing

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag

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Chen, L., Mitchell, C.J. (1997). An anonymous and undeniable payment scheme. In: Han, Y., Okamoto, T., Qing, S. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1334. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0028504

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0028504

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63696-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69628-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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