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Direct demonstration of the power to break public-key cryptosystems

  • Section 1 Public-Key Cryptosystems
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Advances in Cryptology — AUSCRYPT '90 (AUSCRYPT 1990)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 453))

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Abstract

This paper describes a method of proving that a prover (or a crypt-analyst) really knows a secret plaintext or a new code-breaking algorithm for a particular public-key cryptosystem, without revealing any information about the plaintext or algorithm itself. We propose a secure direct protocol which is more efficient than the conventional protocols. This protocol requires only two transmissions between a prover and a verifier. A general form of the secure direct protocol is shown. The explicit forms for the RSA cryptosystem and the discrete logarithm problem are also proposed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Basic Research Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, 3-9-11, Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, 180, Tokyo, Japan

    Kenji Koyama

Authors
  1. Kenji Koyama
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Editor information

Jennifer Seberry Josef Pieprzyk

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© 1990 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Koyama, K. (1990). Direct demonstration of the power to break public-key cryptosystems. In: Seberry, J., Pieprzyk, J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — AUSCRYPT '90. AUSCRYPT 1990. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 453. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0030346

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0030346

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-53000-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46297-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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