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The simulation of localised interaction and learning in artificial adaptive agents

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Evolutionary Computing (AISB EC 1996)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1143))

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Abstract

This study examines the effect of imposing a spatial dynamic on a population of artificial adaptive agents playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We report the results of simulating the increasing and independent localisation of both interaction and learning. Results indicate that both localisations strongly effect the evolution of cooperation. The localisation of learning promotes cooperation, while the localisation of interaction as an ambiguous effect on it. The results seem to suggest a dynamic inter-dependence between the variables.

The authors wish to thank Shaun Hargreaves Heap, John Miller, George Smith, Bob Sugden as well as participants of the SFI 1995 Graduate Workshop in Computational Economics.

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Terence C. Fogarty

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hoffmann, R., Waring, N. (1996). The simulation of localised interaction and learning in artificial adaptive agents. In: Fogarty, T.C. (eds) Evolutionary Computing. AISB EC 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1143. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0032785

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0032785

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61749-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70671-7

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