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Some remarks on a receipt-free and universally verifiable Mix-type voting scheme

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Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT '96 (ASIACRYPT 1996)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1163))

Abstract

At Eurocrypt'95 Sako and Kilian presented the first Mix-type voting scheme which is receipt-free and universally verifiable.

In this contribution we analyze this scheme and show that the coercer must not collude with any center. Otherwise its robustness is lost. As a result, the assumed coercer model is clarified. More seriously, it is further pointed out that the privacy of votes can't be guaranteed, if only one Mix-center is honest. Hence, under the commonly used assumption that only one Mix-center must be honest, the voting scheme is insecure unless modified.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Theoretical Computer Science and Information Security, University of Technology Chemnitz-Zwickau, Straße der Nationen 62, D-09111, Chemnitz, Germany

    Markus Michels & Patrick Horster

Authors
  1. Markus Michels
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  2. Patrick Horster
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Kwangjo Kim Tsutomu Matsumoto

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag

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Michels, M., Horster, P. (1996). Some remarks on a receipt-free and universally verifiable Mix-type voting scheme. In: Kim, K., Matsumoto, T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT '96. ASIACRYPT 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1163. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0034841

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0034841

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61872-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70707-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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