Abstract
In this paper, we describe two serious weaknesses of an identity-based identification scheme proposed by Girault (presented at Eurocrypt '90) that enables adversaries to forge identity, key pairs for a large group of users. We also show how to modify the scheme to make the attacks ineffective.
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References
E. Brickell and K. McCurley, ”An interactive identification scheme based on discrete logarithms”, Advances in Cryptology (Proceedings of EuroCrypt '90), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 473, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 63–71
M. Girault, ”An identity-based identification scheme based on discrete logarithms modulo a composite number”, Advances in Cryptology (Proceedings of EuroCrypt '90), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 473, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 481–486
M. Girault, ”Self-certified public keys”, Advances in Cryptology (Proceedings of EuroCrypt '91), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 547, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 490–497
C. Schnorr, ”Efficient signature generation by smart cards”, Journal of Cryptology, vol. 4, no. 3, 1991, pp. 161–174
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© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Saeednia, S., Safavi-Naini, R. (1998). On the security of Girault's identification scheme. In: Imai, H., Zheng, Y. (eds) Public Key Cryptography. PKC 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1431. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054021
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054021
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-64693-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69105-1
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