Abstract.
The Nash Bargaining Solution is characterised by using the new axiom of Maximal Symmetry in place of Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Symmetry. This axiom expresses the idea that a fair arbitrator should treat symmetric alternatives in the same way, subject to the feasibility constraint. An advantage of the proposed characterisations is that they are valid on a wide set of domains, in particular domains including, or consisting of, non-convex problems.
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Received: 16 March 1998/Accepted: 13 October 1998
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Mariotti, M. Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 45–53 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00007174
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00007174