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Constant-Round Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge from Collision Resistance

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a constant-round leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system for \(\mathcal {NP}\) under the assumption of the existence of collision-resistant hash function families. That is, using a collision-resistant hash function, we construct a constant-round zero-knowledge argument system that has the following zero-knowledge property: even against any cheating verifier that obtains an arbitrary amount of leakage on the prover’s internal secret state, a simulator can simulate the verifier’s view by obtaining the same amount of leakage on the witness. Previously, leakage-resilient zero-knowledge proofs/arguments for \(\mathcal {NP}\) were constructed only under a relaxed security definition (Garg et al., in: CRYPTO’11, pp 297–315, 2011) or under the DDH assumption (Pandey, in: TCC’14, pp 146–166, 2014). Our leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system satisfies an additional property that it is simultaneously leakage-resilient zero-knowledge, meaning that both zero-knowledge and soundness hold in the presence of leakage.

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Notes

  1. In [35], it is pointed out that nowadays leakage tolerance is the commonly accepted term for this security notion. Nevertheless, in this paper we use the term “leakage resilience” for this security notion for consistency with previous works [22, 36].

  2. A constant-round one can be constructed from collision-resistant hash functions [19, 34] and a polynomial-round one can be constructed from one-way functions [29].

  3. This is because in the protocol of [22], the verifier commits to the challenge message of Blum’s Hamiltonicity protocol in advance and hence a cheating prover can easily break soundness by obtaining the challenge message via leakage.

  4. Chung et al. [14] showed that the simulation technique of Barak can be modified so that it requires only one-way functions. However, the simulation technique of Chung et al. involves rewinding of the adversary and therefore is no longer straight-line simulation.

  5. More precisely, td is trapdoor information for biasing the outcome of a coin-tossing protocol that is executed between the prover and the verifier to determine the parameter of an equivocal commitment scheme. However, for simplicity, we think that td is trapdoor information of an equivocal commitment scheme in this overview.

  6. This idea is also used in [5, 32].

  7. What is actually used here is adaptive security, which guarantees that for each underlying commitment, it is possible to compute randomness \(\mathsf {tape}_0\) and \(\mathsf {tape}_1\) such that \(\mathsf {tape}_b\) explains the commitment as a commitment to b for each \(b\in \{0,1 \}\).

  8. This extractability is used only in the proof of soundness. Hence, the proof of zero-knowledge works even in the presence of this extractable commitment scheme.

  9. We notice that although the simulator can use the equivocality of \(\mathsf {H}\textsf {-}\mathsf {Com}\) (which we have introduced to remove the extraction of td), the simulator cannot naively use it for simulating the prover’s messages. This is because when \(V^*\) obtains leakage that includes the randomness that has been used for some of the \(\mathsf {H}\textsf {-}\mathsf {Com}\) commitments, \(V^*\) may be able to determine the committed values of them from the leakage and thus may be able to detect any equivocation on them.

  10. Actually, we use an adaptively secure \(\mathsf {H}\textsf {-}\mathsf {Com}\) [13, 32]. See Footnote 7.

  11. In the “inner” \(\mathsf {H}\textsf {-}\mathsf {Com}\), the underlying commitment scheme is \(\mathsf {Com}\) as before.

  12. For the definition of pseudorandom generators, see [25].

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  1. NTT Research, Sunnyvale, CA, USA

    Susumu Kiyoshima

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Correspondence to Susumu Kiyoshima.

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Communicated by Alon Rosen.

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This article is based on an earlier article: Constant-round Leakage-resilient Zero-knowledge from Collision Resistance, in Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2016, ©IACR 2016, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49896-5_4. Parts of this work were done while the author was a member of NTT Secure Platform Laboratories.

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Kiyoshima, S. Constant-Round Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge from Collision Resistance. J Cryptol 35, 16 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-022-09426-2

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