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Can we wrong a robot?

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Abstract

With the development of increasingly sophisticated sociable robots, robot-human relationships are being transformed. Not only can sociable robots furnish emotional support and companionship for humans, humans can also form relationships with robots that they value highly. It is natural to ask, do robots that stand in close relationships with us have any moral standing over and above their purely instrumental value as means to human ends. We might ask our question this way, ‘Are there ways we can act towards robots that would be wrong to the robot?’ To address this, Part I lays out standard approaches to moral standing: appealing to intrinsic properties, human responses, and values inhering in relationships. Part II explores the third, relational strategy in detail. Looking beyond Western analyses, it considers Eastern philosophy and the environmental philosophy of 'deep ecology' and extends these approaches to sociable robots. Part III examines practical implications for the case of Samantha, a sex robot that was allegedly raped. Part IV identifies and replies to objections.

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Acknowledgements

Portions of this paper were presented in July 2021 at The Chinese University of Hong Kong Center for Bioethics, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong.

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  1. Department of Bioethics and Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine, 1959 NE Pacific Street, Seattle, WA, 98195-7120, USA

    Nancy S. Jecker

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  1. Nancy S. Jecker
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The author is the sole contributor to developing ideas and arguments contained in the paper, researching, and writing the manuscript.

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Correspondence to Nancy S. Jecker.

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Jecker, N.S. Can we wrong a robot?. AI & Soc 38, 259–268 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01278-x

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