Abstract
Nick Bostrom’s “simulation argument” purports to show that if it is possible to create and run a vast number of computer simulations indistinguishable from the reality we are living in, then it is highly probable that we are already living in a computer simulation. However, the simulation argument requires a modification to escape the undermining implications of the scepticism it implies, as argued by Birch. The present paper shows that, even if the modified simulation argument is valid, still it is unsound since it relies on the indistinguishability assumption that even in principle cannot be tested. To account for the unsoundness of the simulation argument, the present paper draws on John Woods' theory of fiction, to expose structural similarities between general fiction and the simulation argument. Though the simulation argument is unsound, it seems persuasive, because the argument immerses the reader in a fictive world with the help of tacit assumptions, leveraging just enough common sense to remain compelling while covering over an untestable premise. Simultaneously with the critique of Bostrom’s argument, Chalmers' argument for the matrix hypothesis is assessed on similar criteria. In either case, both arguments rely on an accumulation of assumptions, both implicit and explicit, hiding the premises that are untestable in principle.
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The author is grateful to Jeffrey White, Karamjit Gill, and to anonymous reviewers with AI & Society for insights and support in bringing this paper to press.
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Agatonović, M. The fiction of simulation: a critique of Bostrom’s simulation argument. AI & Soc 38, 1579–1586 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01312-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01312-y