Abstract
We consider a demand bargaining model where the formateur (proposal maker) is appointed before the players state their demands. In a general continuous framework, we show that if the decision has a distributive dimension, then the formateur gets his way.
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I thank Friedel Bolle, Jonathan Tan, the editor, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the support of the DFG (project no. BO 747/10-1).
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Breitmoser, Y. Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way. Int J Game Theory 38, 183–191 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0144-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0144-3