Abstract
The paper follows Kalai and Samet’s (Econometrica 53:307–327, 1985) construction to define a possible extension of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) to games without transferable utilities. We offer a characterization of the EANSC based on the axiom of independence of irrelevant monotonic transformation [Chang and Hwang (Int J Game Theory 32:253–271, 2003) introduced this axiom, and they named it independence of irrelevant expansions. The referee points out that the terminology is inappropriate. So, we change the name.] introduced by Chang and Hwang (Int J Game Theory 32:253–271, 2003) as well as on several familiar axioms. Specifically, we show that the EANSC is the only solution to satisfy Pareto optimality, translation covariance, anonymity, TU-bilateral consistency (or TU-converse consistency), aggregate monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant monotonic transformation.
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The author is very grateful to a referee who proposed many helpful suggestions and comments to improve the paper. He also thanks an associate editor and Professor William Thomson for their helpful comments.
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Hwang, YA. An NTU value under complement reduced game. Int J Game Theory 38, 305–324 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0155-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0155-8