Abstract
We discuss the relationship between bankruptcy problems and flow sharing problems, respectively, and show that the latter type of problem can be interpreted as a generalization of the former. The corresponding flow sharing game is convex, hence we can use the converse reduced game property to characterize the nucleolus and the constrained egalitarian solution. Our main contribution is thus to introduce the nucleolus as an alternative solution concept for flow sharing problems, and to offer a game-theoretic interpretation of the traditional egalitarian solution.
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Bjørndal, E., Jörnsten, K. Flow sharing and bankruptcy games. Int J Game Theory 39, 11–28 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0174-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0174-5