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Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity

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Abstract

Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393–407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller’s minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Paris School of Economics, 48 Bd Jourdan, 75014, Paris, France

    Laurent Lamy

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  1. Laurent Lamy
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Correspondence to Laurent Lamy.

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Lamy, L. Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity. Int J Game Theory 39, 503–510 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z

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