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Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion

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Abstract

A case study of matching students with dormitory-groups at the Technion lead recently to the study of a variant of the stable matching model with a “qualifying criterion” for the inclusion of a student among those getting an assignment. A notion of stability was introduced for the model and a (student-courting) algorithm which finds a matching that satisfied this criterion and has desired properties was described. Here, we show that students cannot benefit from misrepresenting preferences in an extension of the model that allows dormitory-groups to have different preferences over students and allows these preferences to be incomplete.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Haifa, 32000, Israel

    Nitsan Perach & Uriel G. Rothblum

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  1. Nitsan Perach
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  2. Uriel G. Rothblum
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Correspondence to Uriel G. Rothblum.

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Perach, N., Rothblum, U.G. Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion. Int J Game Theory 39, 657–667 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0210-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0210-5

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