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Michael Maschler’s bibliography

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References

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  2. (1952b) A generalized series to series transformation and its use to find an analytic continuation, M.Sc. thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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  15. (1987) The exponential and logarithmic functions in the new high school curriculum. Abstract from the proceedings of the Israel mathematical union conference. Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University, pp 50–51

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  29. (1992) The general nucleolus and the reduced game property (with Potters JAM, Tijs SH). Int J Game Theory 7:85–106

  30. (1963c) A non-zero-sum game related to a test ban treaty. Applications of statistical methodology to arms control and disarmament. Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/ST-3, Washington, DC, pp 237–287

  31. (1965b) The inspector’s non-constant-sum game: its dependence on one detector. The application of statistical methodology to arms control and disarmament. Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/ST-37, Chap IX. Washington, DC, pp 231–267

  32. (1966b) A price leadership method for solving the inspector’s non-constant-sum game. Naval Res Logist Q 13:11–33

  33. (1967b) The inspector’s non-constant-sum game: its dependence on a system of detectors. Naval Res Logist Q 14:275–290

  34. (1966e) Game-theoretic aspects of gradual disarmament (with Aumann RJ), Development of utility theory for arms control and disarmament. Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/ST-80, Chap V. Washington, DC, pp V1–V55

  35. (1967d) Repeated games with incomplete information: a survey of recent results (with Aumann RJ). Models of gradual reduction of arms. Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/ST-116, Chap III. Washington, DC, pp 287–403

  36. (1968a) Repeated games of incomplete information: the zero-sum extensive case (with Aumann RJ). The indirect measurement of utility. Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/ST-143, Chap III, Washington, DC, pp 37–116

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  38. (1975) Asymptotic stability and other properties of trajectories and transfer sequences leading to the bargaining set (with Kalai G, Owen G). Int J Game Theory 4:193–213

  39. (1976a) Stable sets and stable points of set-valued dynamic systems with applications to game theory (with Peleg B). SIAM J Control Optim 14:985–995

  40. (1988) Paths leading to the Nash set (with Owen G, Peleg B). In: Roth AE (ed) The Shapley value: essays in honor of Lloyd Shapley. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 321–330

  41. (1981) The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game (with Perles MA). Int J Game Theory 10:163–193

  42. (1981) The present status of the super-additive solution (with Perles MA). In: Aumann RJ et al (ed) Essays in game theory and mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Bibliographisches Institut, Mannheim, pp 103–110

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  47. On some spanning network games (with Granot D). Working paper. Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia

  48. (1993) Monotonic games are spanning network games (with van den Nouweland A, Tijs SH). Int J Game Theory 8:419–427

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  50. (1998) Spanning network games (with Granot D). Int J Game Theory 27:467–500

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  52. The Chinese Postman Games where residents of each road pay the cost of their board (with Granot D, Hamers H, Kuipers J). Games Econ Behav (submitted)

  53. The nucleolus of a standard tree game revisited: a study of its monotonicity and computational properties (with Potters J, Reijnierse H). Int J Game Theory (submitted)

  54. (2000) Unanimity in voting for voters (with Granot D, Shalev J). Int Game Theory Rev 2:117–127

  55. (2003) Voting for voters: the unanimity case (with Granot D, Shalev J). Int J Game Theory 31:155–202

  56. (2001) Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution (with Barberà S, Shalev J). Games Econ Behav 37:40–78

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  60. (2004) Encouraging a coalition formation (Also In: Theory Decis 56:25–34). In: Gambarelli G (ed) Essays on cooperative games in honor of Guillermo Owen. Theory and decision library, series c: game theory, mathematical programming and operations research. Kluwer Academic Press, Boston, pp 25–34

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  72. (1962c) Immune coalition structures for n-person cooperative games. Abstract of short communications. International Congress of Mathematics, Stockholm, 163 pp

  73. (1963b) The power of a coalition. Manage Sci 10:8–29

  74. (1964c) Bargaining and group decision-making experiments in bilateral monopoly, by Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouraker. Book review. Econometrica 32:224–227

  75. (1966d) Independent preferences: an area of applicability of utility theory to disarmament problems (with Aumann RJ). Development of utility theory for arms control and disarmament. Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/ST-80, Chap II, Washington, DC, pp II1–II20

  76. (1967a) Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games (with Davis M). In: Shubik M (ed) Essays in mathematical economics, in honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton University Press, pp 39–52 (Abstract in: Bull Am Math Soc 69:106–108 (1963))

  77. (1968b) Repeated games of incomplete information: an approach to the non-zero sum case (with Aumann RJ, Stearns RE). The indirect measurement of utility. Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/ST-143, Chap IV, Washington, DC, pp 117–216

  78. (1976b) An advantage of the bargaining set over the core. J Econ Theory 13:184–192

  79. (1982) The worth of a cooperative enterprise to each member. In: Deistler M, Fürst F, Schwödiauer G (eds) Games, economic dynamics and time series analysis. Physica-Verlag, Wien, pp 67–73

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  81. (1987) Bankruptcy games (with Curiel IJ, Tijs SH). Z Oper Res 31:143–159

  82. (1997) The reactive bargaining set: structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games (with Granot D). Int J Game Theory 26:26–75

  83. (1989) The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games (with Owen G). Int J Game Theory 18:389–407

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  1. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

    Guillermo Owen

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Owen, G. Michael Maschler’s bibliography. Int J Game Theory 39, 301–308 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0214-1

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