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Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria

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Abstract

We study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: EVERY player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash equilibrium is reached in every game where such an equilibrium exists.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Study of Rationality and The Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91904, Jerusalem, Israel

    Yakov Babichenko

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  1. Yakov Babichenko
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Correspondence to Yakov Babichenko.

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Babichenko, Y. Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria. Int J Game Theory 39, 483–502 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0227-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0227-9

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