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An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form

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Abstract

In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form (not necessarily with side payments) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of York, York, UK

    Anindya Bhattacharya

  2. School of Politics, Economics and Philosophy, University of York, York, UK

    Victoria Brosi

Authors
  1. Anindya Bhattacharya
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  2. Victoria Brosi
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Correspondence to Anindya Bhattacharya.

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Bhattacharya, A., Brosi, V. An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form. Int J Game Theory 40, 393–401 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0262-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0262-6

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