Abstract
In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form (not necessarily with side payments) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aumann R, Peleg B (1960) Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments. Bull Am Math Soc 66: 173–179
Beal S, Durieu J, Solal P (2008) Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games. Math Soc Sci 56: 303–313
Chwe M (1994) Farsighted coalitional stability. J Econ Theory 63: 299–325
Diamantoudi E, Xue L (2003) Farsighted stability in hedonic games. Soc Choice Welf 21: 39–61
Diamantoudi E, Xue L (2005) Lucas counter example revisited. University of Aarhus, Economics Working Paper No. 2005-09
Greenberg J, Luo X, Oladi R, Shitovitz B (2002) (Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies. Games Econ Behav 39: 54–70
Harsanyi J (1974) An equilibrium point interpretation of stable sets and a proposed alternative definition. Manag Sci 20: 1472–1495
Kamijo Y, Muto S (2007) Farsighted stability of collusive price leadership. Tokyo Institute of Technology, Discussion Paper No. 07-09
Lucas W (1968) A game with no solution. Bull Am Math Soc 74: 237–239
Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V, Vergote W (2008) Von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching. CORE Discussion Paper
Peleg B (1992) Axiomatizations of the core. In: Aumann R, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 397–412
Scarf H (1967) The core of an N-person game. Econometrica 35: 50–69
Vartiainen H (2008) Dynamic stable set. Mimeo, Turku School of Economics
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bhattacharya, A., Brosi, V. An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form. Int J Game Theory 40, 393–401 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0262-6
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0262-6