Abstract
In the context of cooperative games with transferable utility Hamiache (Int J Game Theory 30:279–289, 2001) utilized continuity, the inessential game property and associated consistency to axiomatize the well-known Shapley value (Ann Math Stud 28:307–317, 1953). The question then arises: “Do there exist linear, symmetric values other than the Shapley value that satisfy associated consistency?”. In this Note we give an affirmative answer to this question by showing that a linear, symmetric value satisfies associated consistency if and only if it is a linear combination of the Shapley value and the equal-division solution. In addition, we offer an explicit formula for generating all such solutions and show how the structure of the null space of the Shapley value contributes to its unique position in Hamiache’s result.
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Notes
To see this observe that \({\mathscr {I}}\) is the isomorphic image of \(R^n\) by the map \(\sigma : R^n \rightarrow {\mathscr {G}} := \sigma _x(S) = \sum _{i \in S} x(\{ i \})\). For consistency with previous work we prefer to define a membership value as a map of \({\mathscr {G}}\) into itself (rather than as a map of \({\mathscr {G}}\) into \(R^n\)), thus necessitating inclusion of the condition (ADD).
The parameter \(\lambda \) was crucial to Hamiache’s result because he did not assume linearity of the solution and required \(0< \lambda < 2/n\) to insure that a certain sequence of repeated games converged. Of course, once it was demonstrated that this solution must be the Shapley value the use of \(\lambda \) became unnecessary since, if a linear value satisfies \(v^*_{\lambda }\)-consistency for one \(\lambda > 0\) then it does so for all.
Note that Driessen required \(b^n_n = 1\) to preserve efficiency. Here we do not impose such a requirement.
References
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by funds from a Baruch College Wasserman Fellowship Grant. The author wishes to thank an anonymous referee for bringing to light the result of Béal et al. and suggesting a simplified proof of the main result which strengthened its conclusions. The author also wishes to thank a second referee who pointed out the relevance of research not previously included in the analysis and who (along with an Associate Editor) emphasized the importance of making the results of this paper more accessible to interested readers.
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Proof of Propositions 6–8
Proof of Propositions 6–8
Note: Below
Proposition 6
Proof
Sufficiency follows from the fact that, for each \(k, 1 \le k \le n-1\) and every \(v \in {\mathscr {Y}}^k\), Equation (5) reduces to
But \(v(S) = A(v,k), \forall S \subset N, \#S = k\), so that the right-hand side above is equal to zero. Thus \({\mathscr {Y}}^k \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\); since k was arbitrary, we conclude \({\mathscr {Y}} \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\).
As for necessity, let k be such that \(1 \le k \le n-1\) and \(c^{k}_0 \ne 0\). Then from Eq. (5), and for any \(v \in {\mathscr {Y}}^k, \ v \ne 0\), we have \(A(v,k) \ne 0\) so that \(\phi _i(v) = c^{k}_0 k^{-1}A(v,k) \ne 0, 1 \le i \le n\). Thus, \({\mathscr {Y}}^k \not \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\), hence \({\mathscr {Y}} \not \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\). \(\square \)
Proposition 7
Proof
Sufficiency: Given any \(k, \ 2 \le k \le n-1\), let \(v \in {\mathscr {D}}^k\); then, recalling that each \({\mathscr {D}}^k \subset {\mathscr {Z}}^0\), we have
where we have set \(c = c^1_1 = c^k_1\). But we observe, in the double sum in Eq. (12), that the term v(i) occurs precisely \(\left( \begin{array}{c} {n-1} \\ {k-1} \end{array}\right) \) times, once in each coalition S of size k containing i. On the other hand \(v(j), j \ne i\), occurs precisely \(\left( \begin{array}{c}{n-2}\\ {k-2} \end{array} \right) \) times, once in each coalition S of size k containing both i and j. Thus, the term in parentheses on the right-hand side of Eq. (12) becomes
where the first equality follows from the definition of \({\mathscr {D}}^k\), the second from our definition of the constant \(\gamma (k)\). Thus \({\mathscr {D}}^k \in {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\); since k was arbitrary, we conclude \({\mathscr {D}} \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\).
Necessity The failure of our hypothesis implies the existence of some \(k,\ 2 \le k \le n-2\) such that \(c^1_1 \ne c^k_1\). Pick then any non-zero \(v \in {\mathscr {D}}^k\); then, Eq. (12) becomes
as we observed in the comments immediately following Eq. (12), the term v(i) in the double sum above occurs precisely \(\left( \begin{array}{c}{n-1} \\ {k-1} \end{array}\right) \) times, once in each coalition S of size k containing i, while \(v(j), j \ne i\), occurs precisely \(\left( \begin{array}{c}{n-2} \\ {k-2} \end{array} \right) \) times, once in each coalition S of size k containing both i and j. Thus, as it did in the sufficiency part of the proof, the term in parentheses reduces to v(i) and we conclude \(\phi _i(v) = (c^1_1 - c^k_1)v(i)\). Since \(v \ne 0\) and \(c^1_1 \ne c^k_1\) we infer the existence of an index \(i^*\) such that \(\phi _{i^*}(v) \ne 0\), hence that \({\mathscr {D}}^k \not \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\), thus that \({\mathscr {D}} \not \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\). \(\square \)
Proposition 8
Proof
For each \(k,\ 2 \le k \le n-2\) and any \(v \in \mathscr {B}^k\), we obtain from Eq. (5)
But, as we observed above, \(v \in {\mathscr {Z}}^0\), thus \(A(v,k) = 0\), so that Eq. (14) reduces to \(\phi _i(v) = c^{k}_1 \gamma (k)^{-1} \sum _{\#S = k,i \in S} v(S) = 0\), the last equality following from the definition of \({\mathscr {B}}^k\). Thus, \({\mathscr {B}}^k \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }, \ 2 \le k \le n-2\), from which we conclude \({\mathscr {B}} \subset {\mathscr {N}}_{\phi }\). \(\square \)
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Kleinberg, N.L. A note on associated consistency and linear, symmetric values. Int J Game Theory 47, 913–925 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0589-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0589-3