Abstract
We study how a principal with an outside option optimally delegates information acquisition to an agent in a parsimonious environment in which the principal can observe neither the agent’s effort nor signal realizations. When the principal chooses an outside option, the true state is not revealed and thus not contractible. We precisely characterize an optimal contract for the principal, illustrating how to construct an optimal contract.


Similar content being viewed by others
Data availability
We do not analyse or generate any datasets, because our work proceeds within a theoretical and mathematical approach.
Notes
Han and Choi (2020) shows that in a binary environment, a principal can always achieve not only the first best payoff but also the first best decision timing when the true state is always contractible.
Recall that p is the belief at which the principal is indifference between the investment and the outside option.
Since \(\pi\) is bounded, we may replace the linear growth condition in Theorem 5.2.1 in Pham (2009) by the boundedness condition.
References
Bergemann D, Hege U (1998) Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning. J Bank Financ 22:703–735
Chade H, Kovrijnykh N (2016) Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard. J Econ Theory 162:55–92
Chambers CP, Lambert NS (2021) Dynamic belief elicitation. Econometrica 89:375–414
Chassang S (2013) Calibrated incentive contracts. Econometrica 81(5):1935–1971
DeMarzo PM, Sannikov Y (2017) Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts. Rev Econ Stud 84(1):182–236
Gerardi D, Maestri L (2012) A principal-agent model of sequential testing. Theor Econ 7:425–463
Grenadier SR, Wang N (2005) Investment timing, agency, and information. J Financ Econ 75:493–533
Halac M, Kartik N, Liu Q (2016) Optimal contracts for experimentation. Rev Econ Stud 83(3):1040–1091
Han K, Choi JH (2020) Optimal contracts for outsourcing information acquisition. Econ Lett 195:109443
Hörner J, Samuelson L (2013) Incentives for experimenting agents. RAND J Econ 44(4):632–663
Hossain T, Okui R (2013) The binarized scoring rule. Rev Econ Stud 80:984–1001
Karatzas I, Shreve S (1998) Brownian motion and stochastic calculus. Springer, Berlin
Karni E (2009) A mechanism for eliciting probabilities. Econometrica 77:603–606
Liptser R, Shiryaev A (2001) Statistics of random processes. Springer, Berlin
Pham H (2009) Continuous-time stochastic control and optimization with financial applications, 1st edn. Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin
Qu X (2012) A mechanism for eliciting a probability distribution. Econ Lett 115:399–400
Shiryaev AN (2008) Optimal stopping rules. Springer, Berlin
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) Grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. 2020R1C1C1A01014142, No. 2021R1I1A1A01050679, and No. 2021R1A4A1032924), and Pusan National University Research Grant, 2022.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Proposition 4.1 in Han and Choi (2020), but we provide the proof for self-containedness. The following lemma states that there exist suitable thresholds and a solution of the differential equation as shown in Fig. 3.
Lemma A.1
There exist constants \(\hat{q}_N \in (0,p)\) and \(\hat{q}_I\in (p,1)\) and a twice differentiable function \({\hat{v}}:(0,1)\mapsto {\mathbb {R}}\) such that
where \(\psi (q):=\max \{L(q),k \}\).
We omit the proof of Lemma A.1, since it is purely technical and identical to the proof of Lemma B.1 in Han and Choi (2020). Using the function \({\hat{v}}\) in Lemma A.1, we define \(V:[0,1]\mapsto {\mathbb {R}}\) as
From construction, we observe that V has enough regularity to apply Ito formula and satisfies
We apply Theorem 8.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev (2001) to (3) and obtain the SDE of \(q_t\):
Note that we set \(\kappa _t=1\) in the above SDE, since we are considering the first best case. For any stopping time \(\tau\) and a constant \(t\ge 0\), Ito formula and the above SDE produce
where the inequality is due to (41), and the inequality becomes equality in cases \(\tau\) equals \({\hat{\tau }}\) in (14). We take expectation above, then the boundedness of \(V'\) and the definition of \(q_s\) in (3) imply
We let \(t \rightarrow \infty\) above, then the boundedness of V, monotone convergence theorem, and (41) produce
Now we conclude that \({\hat{\tau }}\) in (14) is the optimal stopping strategy and V is the first best value, i.e., \(V={\widehat{V}}\) in (15).
B. Proof of Proposition 4.1
(\(\Rightarrow\)) Suppose that a contract \(\gamma\) is ICIR. Define functions \(\pi\) and \(\pi '\) as
It is straightforward to check (16). Substituting \(\phi _\gamma (q,q)\) with \(\pi (q)\) and \(\phi _\gamma (q,{{\tilde{q}}})\) with \(\pi ({{\tilde{q}}})+\pi '({{\tilde{q}}})(q-{{\tilde{q}}})\) in (7), we obtain the inequality \(\pi (q)\ge \pi ({{\tilde{q}}})+\pi '({{\tilde{q}}})(q-{{\tilde{q}}})\), which implies that \(\pi\) is convex and \(\pi '\) is a subgradient of \(\pi\).
Since \(\phi _\gamma (q,q)=\pi (q)\), according to Theorem 5.2.1 in Pham (2009), the unique boundedFootnote 3 viscosity solution of (17) is \(U_\gamma\) in (11). Due to the time homogeneity of the structure, for any \(t\ge 0\),
where the maximum is taken over all stopping times \(\tau \ge t\). Therefore, the condition (8) implies \(U\ge 0\).
The restriction (4) and the expression of \(\pi '\) in (46) imply that \(\pi '(q)=0\) if \({\mathcal {D}}(q)=N\). Then, \(\pi\) is minimized at \(q\in {\mathcal {D}}^{-1}(N)\) by the the convexity of \(\pi\).
(\(\Leftarrow\)) Suppose such \(\pi\) and \(\pi '\) exist. Then, (16) produces \(\phi _\gamma (q,q)=\pi (q)\) and \(\phi _\gamma (q,{{\tilde{q}}})=\pi ({{\tilde{q}}})+\pi '({{\tilde{q}}})(q-{{\tilde{q}}})\). These equalities and the convexity of \(\pi\) imply (7).
The unique bounded viscosity solution of (17) is \(U_\gamma\) in (11) by Theorem 5.2.1 in Pham (2009). Therefore, the nonnegative of \(U_\gamma\) and the characterization (47) imply (8).
Finally, if \({\mathcal {D}}(q)=N\), then (16) and \(\pi '(q)=0\) produce (4). Therefore, we conclude that \(\gamma\) is ICIR.
C. Some technical lemmas
For a given contract, the principal’s expected profit and the agent’s expected profit produce differential equations by the Feynman-Kac formula. In this section, we study some properties of the solution of the differential equations. In Appendix 1, these properties are used to prove Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.3.
The current appendix is rather technical and dense. To improve the readability, we first sketch why we care about the solutions of the differential equations and what properties we want to obtain. The Markovian structure of the optimal stopping problem enable us to focus on the hitting times of \((q_t)_{t\ge 0}\) only (see Lemma D.1 for details). Let us consider the case that the agent reports the belief \(q_\tau\) when \(q_t\) hits a or b, where \(a<q_0<b\). In other words, let us consider \(\tau = \inf \left\{ t\ge 0: \, q_t \notin (a,b) \right\}\). If the principal chooses N in case \(q_\tau =a\) and I in case \(q_\tau =b\) (i.e., \({\mathcal {D}}(a)=N\), \({\mathcal {D}}(b)=I\)), then the sum of the principal’s and agent’s value functions, denoted by \(v_{(a,b)}\), should satisfy the following differential equation with suitable boundary conditions:
We can find an explicit solution of (48), that is,
where the functions f, g and the constant \(\beta\) are
In this case, the agent’s value function should satisfies the same differential equation with boundary condition that its derivative at \(q=a\) equals zero. This boundary condition is due to Proposition 4.1 (3). Motivated by the agent’s value function, for \(0<a<1\), \(\rho , m\in {\mathbb {R}}\), we consider the same differential equation with boundary conditions at \(q=a\) as below:
The explicit solution of (50) is
Lemma C.1 verifies that \(v_{(a,b)}\) and \(u_{(a,\rho ,m)}\) solve differential equations (48) and (50), respectively. Figure 4 illustrates \(v_{(a,b)}\) and \(u_{(a,\rho ,m)}\).
Intuitively, if we consider the smallest amount of the payment that the principal induces the agent to choose a as the left-hand boundary of the continuation interval for the stopping time, then in \(u_{(a,\rho ,m)}\), we should set \(\rho =0\) due to (8) and \(m=0\) due to Proposition 4.1 (3). Therefore, in case the principal asks the agent to gather information, the principal’s maximization problem would be reduced to the following:
For fixed a, let h(a) be the point such that \(v_{(a,h(a))}\) tangentially intersects with the graph of \(\psi\). The existence and properties of the function h are studied in Lemma C.2. In Lemma C.3, it turns out that \(v_{(a,h(a))}(q_0)\ge v_{a,b}(q_0)\) for all b, as Fig. 5 illustrates.
Therefore, (52) becomes the following optimization problem with respect to one variable:
In Lemma C.4, we find a range of \(q_0\) when the above maximum value is bigger than \(\psi (q_0)\) (i.e., when it is better to ask the agent to gather information).
Now we move on to the detailed statements of the technical lemmas and their proofs.
Lemma C.1
The functions \(v_{(a,b)}\) and \(u_{(a,\rho ,m)}\) defined in (49) and (51) are the unique solutions of (48) and (50), respectively. Furthermore, for \(0<a<q_0<b<1\), \(v_{(a,b)}(q_0)\) has the following stochastic representation:
Proof
Direct computations show that \(v_{(a,b)}\) and \(u_{(a,\rho ,m)}\) satisfy the differential equations with the boundary conditions. The solution is unique due to the uniform ellipticity of the operator \({\mathcal {L}}\) on every compact subset of (0, 1).
Since \(v_{(a,b)}\) satisfies (48), we obtain the stochastic representation of \(v_{(a,b)}\) by Proposition 7.2 and Lemma 7.4 in Karatzas and Shreve (1998). \(\square\)
In fact, the second-order differential equation \({\mathcal {L}}v=0\) has an explicit form of the general solution:
where \(C_1\) and \(C_2\) are free constants. This implies that
Lemma C.2
Assume that \(0<a<p\). (1) There exists a constant \({\underline{m}}> - \tfrac{(\beta +a)(c+rk)}{a(1-a)r}\) such that
and \(u_{(a,k,{\underline{m}})}\) tangentially intersects with the graph of \(q\mapsto L(q)\) at a single point, namely, at \(q=h(a)\in (a,1)\). (2) h(a) above satisfies
(3) The function \(h:[{\hat{q}}_N, p) \longrightarrow (p, {\hat{q}}_I]\) is continuous, bijective, and monotone decreasing. Therefore, its inverse function \(h^{-1}: (p, {\hat{q}}_I]\longrightarrow [{\hat{q}}_N, p)\) is well-defined and continuous. Furthermore,
Proof
Observe that \(0<a<p\) implies that
(1) Since \({\mathcal {L}} u_{(a,k,m)}=0\), the form of \({\mathcal {L}}\) in (18) implies that
By (51) and the fact that \(\frac{f(q)}{g(q)}\) is an increasing function for \(q\in (0,1)\), we observe that for \(q\in (a,1)\) and \(m> - \tfrac{(\beta +a)(c+rk)}{a(1-a)r}\), the inequality \(\frac{c}{r}+u_{(a,k,m)}(q) >0\) holds. Therefore,
If \(m> x-y\), then \(u'_{(a,k,m)}(a)>x-y=L'(a)\). Together with (60) and (62), we obtain
On the other hand,
The observations (63) and (64) and the continuous dependence of \(u_{(a,k,m)}\) on m imply the existence of \({\underline{m}}\) in (57). The strict convexity in (62) ensures that \(u_{(a,k,{\underline{m}})}\) tangentially intersects with the graph of \(q\mapsto L(q)\) at a single point, namely, at \(q=h(a)\in (a,1)\).
(2) By construction, such h(a) satisfies
Comparing above condition with (48) and (50), we obtain (58).
(3) The continuity of h is clear from the construction. Comparing (39) with (48) and (58), we obtain
For \(a\in ({\hat{q}}_N,p)\), we prove \(h(a)< {\hat{q}}_I\) by contradiction. Suppose that \(h(a)> {\hat{q}}_I\). Since \(v_{(a,h(a))}\) and \(v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}\) are strictly convex for \(q\in ({\hat{q}}_I,h(a))\) and touch the straight line L tangentially, we deduce that \(v_{(a,h(a))}({\hat{q}}_I)>v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}({\hat{q}}_I)\) and \(v_{(a,h(a))}(h(a))<v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}(h(a))\). These inequalities imply that \(v_{(a,h(a))}\) and \(v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}\) intersect at least once for \(q\in ({\hat{q}}_I,h(a))\). Using (56), we conclude that \(v_{(a,h(a))}(q)>v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}(q)\) for \(q\in (0,{\hat{q}}_I)\). This contradicts to \(v_{(a,h(a))}(a)=k<v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}(a)\), where the inequality is due to \(a>{\hat{q}}_N\) and (39), together with the strict convexity of \(v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}\). Therefore, we conclude that for \(a\in ({\hat{q}}_N,p)\), \(h(a)\le {\hat{q}}_I\). We can exclude the case \(h(a)={\hat{q}}_I\), because the solution of \({\mathcal {L}}v=0\) with boundary conditions \(v({\hat{q}}_I)=L({\hat{q}}_I)\) and \(v'({\hat{q}}_I)=L'({\hat{q}}_I)\) is unique.
Let us check (59). For \(a\in ({\hat{q}}_N,p)\), we have already concluded that \(h(a)<{\hat{q}}_I\), so \(v_{(a,h(a))}\) and \(v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}\) intersect for \(q\in (h(a),{\hat{q}}_I)\). If \(v_{(a,h(a))}'(a)\le 0\), then the convexity argument implies that \(v_{(a,h(a))}\) and \(v_{({\hat{q}}_N,{\hat{q}}_I)}\) also intersect for \(q\in ({\hat{q}}_N,a)\), but this contradicts to (56). Therefore, we conclude that \(v_{(a,h(a))}'(a)> 0\). The case of \(a\in (0,{\hat{q}}_N)\) can be treated by the same way.
We repeat the same procedure as above using (56), and conclude that \(p<h(a_2)<h(a_1)<{\hat{q}}_I\) for \({\hat{q}}_N< a_1<a_2<p\). Then, to complete the proof, it only remains to show that the function \(h:[{\hat{q}}_N, p) \longrightarrow (p, {\hat{q}}_I]\) is surjective. Indeed, for any \(b\in (p,{\hat{q}}_I)\), there exists a unique solution v of \({\mathcal {L}}v=0\) with boundary conditions \(v(b)=L(b)\) and \(v'(b)=L'(b)\). By the same procedure as above, there exists \(a\in ({\hat{q}}_I,p)\) such that \(v(a)=k\). Then, we conclude that \(v=v_{(a,b)}\) and \(h(a)=b\). \(\square\)
Figure 6 illustrates Lemma C.2.
Lemma C.3
For \(a\in (0,p)\), we define the function \(w_a:(0,1)\longrightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\) as
(1) Suppose that \(q_0\in ({\hat{q}}_N,p]\). Then, there exists \(a^*\in ({\hat{q}}_N,q_0)\) such that
(2) Suppose that \(q_0\in (p,{\hat{q}}_I)\). Then, one of the following holds:
(i) There exists \(a^*\in ({\hat{q}}_N,h^{-1}(q_0))\) such that
(ii) Otherwise,
Proof
We start with several observations. The boundary condition in (50) and the observation (61) imply
Since \(q\mapsto \frac{f(q)}{g(q)}\) is a strictly increasing function, direct computations show that
For \(0<a<p\), the construction of \({\underline{m}}\) in Lemma C.2 implies that if \(m>\underline{m}\), then \(u_{(a,k,m)}\) does not intersects with the graph of \(q\mapsto L(q)\) on \(q\in (a,1)\). Therefore, by (48) and (50), there exists \(m\le {\underline{m}}\) such that \(v_{(a,b)}=u_{(a,k,m)}\). Together with (58) and (69), this implies
By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma C.2 (3) using (56), we obtain
See Figure 7 for illustrations of (71) and (72).
By Lemma C.1, we observe that \(w_a\) satisfies
Furthermore, \(u_{(a,0,0)}'(a)=0\) and (59) imply
(1) Suppose that \(q_0\in ({\hat{q}}_N,p]\). Since \(v_{(a,b)}\) and \(u_{(a,0,0)}\) continuously depend on a and b, the map \(a\mapsto w_a(q_0)\) is continuous due to the continuity of h in Lemma C.2. Since a continuous function has a maximum value on a compact interval, there exists \(a^*\in [{\hat{q}}_N, q_0]\) such that
The stochastic representation (54) and the optimality of \({\hat{\tau }}\) in (14) imply that
From the construction of h in Lemma C.2, we can see that
with standard big \({\mathcal {O}}\) notation. By (76) and (77), we obtain
Combining (70) and (78), we conclude that \(w_a(q_0)>w_{{\hat{q}}_N}(q_0)\) for a slightly bigger than \({\hat{q}}_N\), and this means that \(a^* \ne {\hat{q}}_N\). Also, by (73) and (74), we observe that \(w_a (q_0)>k=w_{q_0}(q_0)\) for \(a\in ({\hat{q}}_N, q_0)\), and this implies that \(a^* \ne q_0\). All in all, we improve (75) as
Suppose that \(a\in [{\hat{q}}_N, q_0)\) and \(b\in (q_0,1)\). Then by (71) and (79), we obtain the desired inequality: \(v_{(a,b)}(q_0)- u_{(a,0,0)}(q_0)\le w_a(q_0) \le w_{a^*}(q_0)\).
To complete the proof of part (1), we suppose that \(a\in (0,{\hat{q}}_N)\) and \(b\in (q_0,1)\). In case \(v_{(a,b)}(q_0)\le k\), (68) and (79) imply \(v_{(a,b)}(q_0)-u_{(a,0,0)}(q_0)<k< w_{a^*}(q_0)\). In case \(v_{(a,b)}(q_0)> k\), the argument we made for (71) implies that \(v_{(a,b)}'(a)<0\) and \(b>p\ge q_0\). By the intermediate value theorem, there exists \({\tilde{a}}\in ({\hat{q}}_N, q_0)\) such that \(v_{(a,b)}({\tilde{a}})=k\). Since the solution of the differential equation (48) is unique, we conclude that \(v_{(a,b)}=v_{({\tilde{a}}, b)}\). This observation, together with the inequalities (70) and (71), implies that
where the last inequality is due to \({\tilde{a}}\in ({\hat{q}}_N, q_0)\) and (79).
(2) Suppose that \(q_0\in (p,{\hat{q}}_I)\). By the same way as in the proof of part (1), we conclude that
Suppose that \(a\in (h^{-1}(q_0),q_0)\) and \(b\in (q_0,1)\). By (72), we obtain \(v_{(a,b)}(q_0)<\psi (q_0)\). This inequality and (68) produce \(v_{(a,b)}(q_0)- u_{(a,0,0)}(q_0)<\psi (q_0)\). Combining this observation and (80), we conclude that
To complete the proof, due to the above inequality, it is enough to observe that
where the inequality is due to (68). \(\square\)
Lemma C.4
There exists \(q^\dagger \in (p,{\hat{q}}_I)\) such that the followings hold:
(1) If \(q_0 \in ({\hat{q}}_N, q^\dagger )\), then there exist \(q^*_N\in ({\hat{q}}_N, \min \{q_0,p\})\) and \(q^*_I \in (\max \{q_0,p\},{\hat{q}}_I)\) such that
(2) If \(q_0 \in [q^\dagger ,{\hat{q}}_I)\), then
Proof
For \(a\in ({\hat{q}}_N,p)\), by (73) and (74), we observe that \(w_a\) is strictly increasing and strictly convex for \(q\in (a,1)\). The definition of \(w_a\) in (67) and the positivity of \(u_{(a,0,0)}\) in (68) imply that
By the strict convexity and the intermediate value theorem, we conclude that there exists \(q^\#\) such that
Therefore, \(w_a(q)<\psi (q)\) implies \(w_a(q')<\psi (q')\) for \(a<q'<q\) and \(w_a(q+\epsilon )<\psi (q+\epsilon )\) for small enough \(\epsilon >0\). This observation shows that there exists a constant \(q^\dagger \in ({\hat{q}}_N, {\hat{q}}_I)\) such that
since the right-hand side is a connected open set.
By Lemma C.3 (1) and (79), if \(q_0\in ({\hat{q}}_N,p]\), then there exists \(a^*\in ({\hat{q}}_N,q_0)\) such that
This implies \(q^\dagger >p\). We also observe that \(q^\dagger <{\hat{q}}_I\), because
and the continuous dependence of \(w_a\) on a imply that \(w_a(q)<\psi (q)\) for q and h(a) close enough to \({\hat{q}}_I\).
From the above construction of \(q^\dagger \in (p,{\hat{q}}_I)\), we set \(q^*_N:=a^*\) and \(q^*_I:=h(a^*)\) in Lemma C.3 to obtain the desired result, except the inequality \(v_{(q^*_N,q^*_I)}(q_0)<{\widehat{V}}(q_0)\). The inequality is derived from the proof of Lemma C.2 (3). \(\square\)
D. Proof of Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.3
For a given ICIR contract, we first characterize the optimal stopping time and the value of the agent’s maximization problem.
Lemma D.1
Let \(\gamma\) be an ICIR contract and \(\tau _{\gamma }\) be the corresponding optimal stopping time of the agent. Then, one of the following holds:
-
(1)
\(\tau _{\gamma }= 0\) and \(U_{\gamma }(q_0)=\phi _\gamma (q_0,q_0)\).
-
(2)
There exists two constants \({{\underline{q}}}\) and \({{\overline{q}}}\) such that \(0<{{\underline{q}}}<q_0<{{\overline{q}}}<1\) and
-
(i)
\(\tau _{\gamma }=\inf \left\{ t\ge 0: \, q_t \notin ({{\underline{q}}}, {{\overline{q}}}) \right\}\).
-
(ii)
\(U_\gamma\) is a classical solution of \({\mathcal {L}}U=0\) on \(({{\underline{q}}},{{\overline{q}}})\), and \(U_\gamma (q) >\phi _\gamma (q,q)\) for \(q\in ({{\underline{q}}},{{\overline{q}}})\).
-
(iii)
\(U_\gamma ({{\underline{q}}})\ge 0\), and \(\lim _{q \downarrow {{\underline{q}}}} U_\gamma '(q)=0\) if \({{\underline{q}}}\in {\mathcal {D}}^{-1}(N)\).
-
(i)
Proof
By Proposition 4.1, there exists a convex function \(\pi :[0,1]\longrightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\) such that the value function \(U_\gamma\) is the unique viscosity solution of (11). It is well-known that (see, e.g., Chapter 5.2 in Pham (2009)) the optimal stopping time \(\tau _\gamma\) is characterized as
and it is the unique optimal stopping time due to our tiebreak rule. One of the following holds:
(1) Suppose that \(q_0\notin {\mathcal {C}}\). In this case, \(\tau _\gamma =0\) and \(U_\gamma (q_0)=\pi (q_0)=\phi _\gamma (q_0,q_0)\).
(2) Suppose that \(q_0 \in {\mathcal {C}}\). In this case, since the set \({\mathcal {C}}\) is an open set due to the continuity of \(U_\gamma\) and \(\pi\), there exists \({{\underline{q}}}<q_0<{{\overline{q}}}\) such that \({{\underline{q}}}, {{\overline{q}}}\notin {\mathcal {C}}\) and \(({{\underline{q}}},{{\overline{q}}}) \subset {\mathcal {C}}\). Then, \(\tau _\gamma\) in (82) becomes \(\tau _{\gamma }=\inf \left\{ t\ge 0: \, q_t \notin ({{\underline{q}}}, {{\overline{q}}}) \right\}\) and \(U_\gamma (q) >\pi (q)=\phi _\gamma (q,q)\) for \(q\in ({{\underline{q}}},{{\overline{q}}})\). By Lemma 5.2.2 in Pham (2009), \(U_\gamma\) is a classical solution of \({\mathcal {L}}U=0\) on \(({{\underline{q}}},{{\overline{q}}})\). Since the solution of \({\mathcal {L}}U=0\) is unbounded on (0, 1), we conclude that \(0<{{\underline{q}}}<{{\overline{q}}}<1\).
Since \(\gamma\) is ICIR, we have \(U_\gamma ({{\underline{q}}})\ge 0\).
Finally, assume that \({{\underline{q}}}\in {\mathcal {D}}^{-1}(N)\). The form of \({\mathcal {L}}U=0\) implies that \(U_\gamma\) is convex for \(q\in ({{\underline{q}}},{{\overline{q}}})\). Since \(U_\gamma ({{\underline{q}}})=\pi ({{\underline{q}}})\) and \(U_\gamma (q) >\pi (q)\) for \(q\in ({{\underline{q}}},{{\overline{q}}})\), we conclude that
where the equality is due to the third statement in Proposition 4.1. Indeed, we can further check that \(\alpha _1=0\). Suppose not, i.e., \(\alpha _1 >0\). Let \(\varphi (x):=U_\gamma ({{\underline{q}}})+\frac{\alpha _1}{2} (x-{{\underline{q}}})+\alpha _2 (x-{{\underline{q}}})^2\) for \(\alpha _2\in {\mathbb {R}}\). Then \(U_\gamma \ge \pi\) and \(\pi '({{\underline{q}}})=0\) imply that \(\varphi\) satisfies
Since \(\varphi \in C^2({\mathbb {R}})\), the above conditions imply that \(\varphi\) can be used as a test function for the viscosity supersolution property of \(U_\gamma\) (see, e.g., Chapter 5 in Pham (2009) for details):
However, if we choose large enough \(\alpha _2\) above, then the inequality is violated. Therefore, we reach a contradiction and conclude that \(\alpha _1=0\). \(\square\)
According to Lemma D.1, we have
Considering the principal’s decision map \({\mathcal {D}}\), we can further decompose \(\Gamma _c\) as
where
Lemma D.2
For \(d_1, d_2 \in \{ N,I \}\), let \(\Gamma _c^{d_1 d_2}\) be as in (85). Then,
Proof
Obviously, \(W_{\gamma _0}(q_0)\le \psi (q_0)\) for \(\gamma \in \Gamma _s\). To prove the lemma, by (83) and (84), it is enough to check \(W_\gamma (q_0)\le \psi (q_0)\) for \(\gamma \in \Gamma _c^{II}\cup \Gamma _c^{NN} \cup \Gamma _c^{IN}\). For \(\gamma \in \Gamma _c^{II}\cup \Gamma _c^{NN} \cup \Gamma _c^{IN}\), there exist \({{\underline{q}}}\) and \({{\overline{q}}}\) satisfying the conditions in Lemma D.1 (2) case. Let l be the linear function whose graph is the line segment connecting two points \(({{\underline{q}}},l({{\underline{q}}}))\) and \(({{\overline{q}}},l({{\overline{q}}}))\), where
The form of \(\tau _\gamma\) described in Lemma D.1 (2) implies that
where the inequality is due to \(r>0\), \(c>0\) and \(U_\gamma \ge 0\), and the second equality is due to the martingale property of \((q_t)_{t \ge 0}\) and the linearity of l. Finally, we complete the proof by observing that that \(\gamma \in \Gamma _c^{II}\cup \Gamma _c^{NN} \cup \Gamma _c^{IN}\) implies \(l(q) \le \psi (q)\) for \(q\in [{{\underline{q}}},{{\overline{q}}}]\). \(\square\)
For constants a and b, we define \(\Gamma _c^{NI}(a,b)\) as
By definition, we observe that
Lemma D.3
Assume that \(0<a<q_0<b<1\). Then, \(U_{\gamma }(q_0) \ge u_{(a,0,0)}(q_0)\) for \(\gamma \in \Gamma _c^{NI}(a,b)\).
Proof
Let \(\gamma \in \Gamma _c^{NI}(a,b)\). According to Lemma D.1 and (50), there exist constants \(\rho \ge 0\) and \(m\ge 0\) such that \(U_\gamma (q_0)=u_{(a,\rho ,m)}(q_0)\). Observe that
The above inequality and (69), together with the restrictions \(\rho \ge 0\) and \(m \ge 0\), produce the inequality \(u_{(a,0,0)}(q_0)\le u_{(a,\rho ,m)}(q_0)= U_\gamma (q_0)\). \(\square\)
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.3 at the same time. By the stochastic representation (54) and the definition of \(U_\gamma\) and \(W_\gamma\) in (11) and (12), we obtain
Let \(q^\dagger \in (p,{\hat{q}}_I)\) be as in Lemma C.4. We consider two cases: \(q_0 \in [q^\dagger ,{\hat{q}}_I)\) and \(q_0 \in ({\hat{q}}_N, q^\dagger )\).
(1) Suppose that \(q_0 \in [q^\dagger ,{\hat{q}}_I)\). By Lemma C.4, Lemma D.3 and Eq. (90), we obtain
We combine the above inequality, Lemma D.2 and the decomposition (89) to conclude that \(W_\gamma (q_0) \le \psi (q_0)\) for \(\gamma \in \Gamma\). In this case, the principal does not propose a contract.
(2) Suppose that \(q_0 \in ({\hat{q}}_N, q^\dagger )\). By Lemma C.4, Lemma D.3 and Eq. (90), there exist \(q^*_N\in ({\hat{q}}_N, \min \{q_0,p\})\) and \(q^*_I \in (\max \{q_0,p\},{\hat{q}}_I)\) such that
Now we define \(\gamma ^*=({\mathcal {D}}^*, {\mathcal {P}}^*)\) as
Figure 8 illustrates \(u_{(q^*_N,0,0)}\) and \(\pi ^*\).
The definition of \(\pi ^*\) and the differential equation (50) imply that
Therefore, by Proposition 4.1, the corresponding value of the agent and the optimal stopping time are
By (54) and the above observation, we obtain
We combine the above equality, Lemma D.2, the decomposition (89) and the inequalities (92), and conclude that \({\hat{\gamma }}\) constructed in (93) is the optimal contract with the optimal stopping time (31) and the inequalities in (32)–(33) hold.
Obviously, (1) and (2) above imply Lemma 4.2.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Choi, J.H., Han, K. Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option. Int J Game Theory 52, 833–860 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7