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Population monotonic solutions on convex games

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Abstract.

The Dutta-Ray solution and the Shapley value are two well-known examples of population-monotonic solutions on the domain of convex games. We provide a new formula for the Dutta-Ray solution from which population-monotonicity immediately follows. Then we define a new family of population-monotonic solutions, which we refer to as “sequential Dutta-Ray solutions.” We also show that it is possible to construct several symmetric and population-monotonic solutions by using the solutions in this family.

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Received September 1998/Revised version: December 1999

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Hokari, T. Population monotonic solutions on convex games. Game Theory 29, 327–338 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000043

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000043