Abstract.
In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player’s “a priori” value in such a game. In this paper, we show that the value has a consistency property similar to the “consistency” for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value.
The games considered in this paper differ from the multi-choice games considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [1993]. They consider games in which the actions of the players are ordered in the sense that, if i >j, then action i carries more “weight” than action j.
These games also differ from partition function games in that the worth of a coalition depends not only on the partitioning of the players but also on the action chosen by each subset of the partition.
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Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999
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Bolger, E. A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives. Game Theory 29, 93–99 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050007
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050007