Abstract.
We prove that for superadditive games a necessary and sufficient condition for the bargaining set to coincide with the core is that the monotonic cover of the excess game induced by a payoff be balanced for each imputation in the bargaining set. We present some new results obtained by verifying this condition for specific classes of games. For N-zero-monotonic games we show that the same condition required at each kernel element is also necessary and sufficient for the kernel to be contained in the core. We also give examples showing that to maintain these characterizations, the respective assumptions on the games cannot be lifted.
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Received: March 1998/Revised version: December 1998
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Solymosi, T. On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games. Game Theory 28, 229–240 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050015
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050015