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Duality and markovian strategies

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Abstract.

We introduce the dual of a stochastic game with incomplete information on one side, and we deduce some properties of optimal strategies of the uninformed player.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratoire d'Econométrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 1, rue Descartes, F-75005 Paris, France, , , , , , FR

    Dinah Rosenberg

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  1. Dinah Rosenberg
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Received December 1996/Revised version December 1997

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Rosenberg, D. Duality and markovian strategies. Game Theory 27, 577–597 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050091

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050091

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