Skip to main content
Log in

The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals

  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

    We’re sorry, something doesn't seem to be working properly.

    Please try refreshing the page. If that doesn't work, please contact support so we can address the problem.

Abstract.

The paper provides an explanation for altruistic behavior based on the matching and learning technology in the population. In a infinite structured population, in which individuals meet and interact with their neighbors, individuals learn by imitating their more successful neighbors. We ask which strategies are robust against invasion of mutants: A strategy is unbeatable if when all play it and a finite group of identical mutants enters then the learning process eliminates the mutants with probability 1. We find that such an unbeatable strategy is necessarily one in which each individual behaves as if he is related to his neighbors and takes into account their welfare as well as his. The degree to which he cares depends on the radii of his neighborhoods.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Received June 1996/Revised version October 1998

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Eshel, I., Sansone, E. & Shaked, A. The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals. Game Theory 28, 447–463 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050119

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050119

Navigation