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Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory

arXiv:cs/0103019 (cs)
[Submitted on 27 Mar 2001]

Title:On the NP-completeness of Finding an Optimal Strategy in Games with Common Payoffs

Authors:Francis Chu, Joseph Y. Halpern
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Abstract: Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy where each player has an expected payoff of at least r is NP-complete as a function of the number of nodes in the extensive-form representation of the game.
Comments: To appear, International Journal of Game Theory
Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Computational Complexity (cs.CC); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC)
ACM classes: D.1.3
Cite as: arXiv:cs/0103019 [cs.GT]
  (or arXiv:cs/0103019v1 [cs.GT] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.cs/0103019

Submission history

From: Joseph Y. Halpern [view email]
[v1] Tue, 27 Mar 2001 19:51:09 UTC (23 KB)
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