Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

N-Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous payoffs

  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

Every n-person stochastic game with a countable state space, finite action sets for the players and bounded, upper semi-continuous payoffs has an ε-equilibrium for every ε>0.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Matematica, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, 20133 Milano, Italy, , , , , , IT

    Piercesare Secchi

  2. School of Statistics, University of Minnesota, Church Street SE 224, 55455 Minneapolis, USA (e-mail: bill@stat.umn.edu), , , , , , US

    William D. Sudderth

Authors
  1. Piercesare Secchi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. William D. Sudderth
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

Received: January 2001

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Secchi, P., Sudderth, W. N-Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous payoffs. Game Theory 30, 491–502 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200091

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200091

Search

Navigation