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Stay-in-a-set games

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Abstract.

There exists a Nash equilibrium (ε-Nash equilibrium) for every n-person stochastic game with a finite (countable) state space and finite action sets for the players if the payoff to each player i is one when the process of states remains in a given set of states G i and is zero otherwise.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Matematica, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, 20133 Milano, Italy, , , , , , IT

    Piercesare Secchi

  2. School of Statistics, University of Minnesota, Church Street SE 224, 55455 Minneapolis, USA (e-mail: bill@stat.umn.edu), , , , , , US

    William D. Sudderth

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  1. Piercesare Secchi
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  2. William D. Sudderth
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Received: December 2000

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Secchi, P., Sudderth, W. Stay-in-a-set games. Game Theory 30, 479–490 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200092

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200092

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