Abstract
A class of N-person stochastic games of resource extraction with discounted payoffs in discrete time is considered. It is assumed that transition probabilities have special additive structure. It is shown that the Nash equilibria and corresponding payoffs in finite horizon games converge as horizon goes to infinity. This implies existence of stationary Nash equilibria in the infinite horizon case. In addition the algorithm for finding Nash equilibria in infinite horizon games is discussed
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Szajowski, P. Constructions of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games of Resource Extraction with Additive Transition Structure. Math Meth Oper Res 63, 239–260 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-005-0015-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-005-0015-7