Skip to main content
Log in

Optimal Supply Functions in Electricity Markets with Option Contracts and Non-smooth Costs

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the optimal supply function for a generator who sells electricity into a wholesale electricity spot market and whose profit function is not smooth. In previous work in this area, the generator’s profit function has usually been assumed to be continuously differentiable. However in some interesting instances, this assumption is not satisfied. These include the case when a generator signs a one-way hedge contract before bidding into the spot market, as well as a situation in which a generator owns several generation units with different marginal costs. To deal with the non-smooth problem, we use the model of Anderson and Philpott, in which the generator’s objective function is formulated as a Stieltjes integral of the generator’s profit function along his supply curve. We establish the form of the optimal supply function when there are one-way contracts and also when the marginal cost is piecewise smooth.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Anderson EJ, Philpott AB (2002) Optimal offer construction in electricity markets. Math Oper Res 27:82–100

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson EJ, Philpott AB (2003) Estimation of market distribution functions. Ann Oper Res 121:21–32

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson EJ, Xu H (2002) Necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal offers in electricity markets. SIAM J Control Optim 41:1212–1228

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson EJ, Xu H (2004) Nash equilibria in electricity markets with discrete prices. Math Methods Oper Res 60:215–238

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson EJ, Xu H (2005) Contracts and supply functions in electricity markets. J Optim Theory Appl 124:257–283

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson EJ, Xu H (2005) ɛ-Optimal bidding in an electricity market with discontinuous market distribution function. SIAM J Control Optim 44:1391–1418

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Baldick R, Hogan W (2001) Capacity constrained supply function equilibrium models of electricity markets: stability, non-decreasing constraints, and function space iterations. University of California Energy Institute, POWER Paper PWP-089

  • Baldick R, Grant R, Kahn E (2004) Theory and application of linear supply function equilibrium in electricity markets. J Regul Econ 25(2):143–167

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bolle F (1992) Supply function equilibria and the danger of tacit collusion, the case of spot markets for electricity. Energy Econ 14:94–102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Borenstein S (2001) The trouble with electricity markets (and some solutions). Working paper, University of California Energy Institute

  • Deng SJ, Oren SS (2005) Electricity derivatives and risk management. Power Systems Engineering Research Centre, Working Paper 05–08

  • Green RJ (1999) The electricity contract market in England and Wales. J Indus Econ 47:107–124

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green RJ, Newbery DM (1992) Competition in the British electricity spot market. J Polit Econ 100:929–953

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gans JS, Price D, Woods K (1998) Contracts and electricity pool prices. Aust J Manage 23:83–96

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan W (1962) Advanced calculus. Addison-Wiley, Reading

    Google Scholar 

  • Klemperer PD, Meyer MA (1989) Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty. Econometrica 57:1243–1277

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Newbery DM (1998) Competition, contracts and entry in the electricity spot market. RAND J Econ 29:726–749

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rudkevich A (1999) Supply function equilibrium in poolco type power markets: learning all the way. Technical Report TCA Technical Paper Number 0699–1701, Tabors Caramanis and Associates

  • Rudkevich A (2005) On the supply function equilibrium and its applications in electricity markets. Decision Support Syst 40:409–425

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rudkevich A, Duckworth M, Rosen R (1998) Modeling electricity pricing in a deregulated generation industry: the potential for oligopoly pricing in a poolco. Energy J 19:19–48

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Der Fehr N-HM, Harbord D (1992) Long-term contracts and imperfectly competitive spot markets: a study of the UK electricity industry. Memorandum No. 14, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Edward J. Anderson.

Additional information

We would like to thank two anonymous referees for careful reading of the paper and helpful comments which lead to a significant improvement of this paper.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Anderson, E.J., Xu, H. Optimal Supply Functions in Electricity Markets with Option Contracts and Non-smooth Costs. Math Meth Oper Res 63, 387–411 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0062-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0062-8

Keywords

Navigation