Abstract
In this paper we introduce a model of cooperative game with externalities which generalizes games in partition function form by allowing players to take part in more than one coalition. We provide an extension of the Shapley value (1953) to these games, which is a generalization of the Myerson value (1977) for games in partition function form. This value is derived by considering an adaptation of an axiomatic characterization of the Myerson value (1977).
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Albizuri MJ, Arin J, Rubio J (2005) An axiom system for a value for games in partition function form. Int J Game Theory Rev 7(1): 63–72
Bolger EM (1989) A set of axioms for a value for partition function games. Int J Game Theory 18: 37–44
de Clippel G, Serrano R (2005) Marginal contributions and externalities in the value. Brown University Working Paper 2005–2011
Lucas W, Thrall R (1963) n-person games in partition function form. Naval Res Logi Q X: 281–298
Macho-Stadler I, Pérez-Castrillo D, Wettstein D (2007) Sharing the surplus: an extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities. J Econ Theory 135: 339–356
Myerson RB (1977) Values of games in partition function form. Int J Game Theory 6: 23–31
Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn HW, Tucker AW (eds) Contributions to the theory of games II, 307–317
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This research has been partially supported by the University of the Basque Country (IT-293-07) and the Ministry of Education and Science (projects SEJ2006-05455 and ECO2009-11213).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Albizuri, M.J. Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form. Math Meth Oper Res 72, 171–186 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-010-0314-5
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-010-0314-5