Abstract
This paper presents an extension of the traditional bankruptcy problem. In a resource allocation problem there is a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each agent is characterized by a claim on this pool and an individual linear monetary reward function for assigned resources. Analyzing these problems a new class of transferable utility games is introduced, called resource allocation games. These games are based on the bankruptcy model, as introduced by O’Neill (Math Soc Sci 2:345–371, 1982). It is shown that the properties of totally balancedness and compromise stability can be extended to resource allocation games, although the property of convexity is not maintained in general. Moreover, an explicit expression for the nucleolus of these games is provided.
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Notes
Two TU-games \(v\) and \(w\) with player set \(N\) are called strategically equivalent if there exist a positive real number \(k\) and a vector \(a\in \mathbb R ^N\) such that \(w(S)=kv(S)+\sum _{j\in S}a_j\) for all \(S\in 2^N\).
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Appendix
Appendix
In this Appendix we present the proofs of Lemmas 1, 2, 3, and Theorem 4.
Proof
(Lemma 1) Let \(S\subset T\subset N\). We will prove that
First assume that \(D(T)=0\). Then \(k(T)=1\) and
Hence,
This implies \(D(S)=0\) and \(k(S)=1\).
Next assume that \(D(T)>0\). First note that
If \(D(S)=0\), then \(k(S)=1\le k(T)\) by definition. Therefore, we may assume that \(D(S)>0\) and \(D(S)=D(T)-\sum _{j\in T\setminus S}d_j\). It follows that
where the first and last inequality follow from (6). This implies that \(k(S)-1< k(T)\) and consequently \(k(S)\le k(T)\). \(\square \)
Proof
(Lemma 2) Let \(l\in \{1,\ldots ,m\}\). We will prove that
If \(D(S)=0\), then it holds that
Assume \(D(S)>0\). As before, this implies that \(D(S)=D(T)-\sum _{j\in T\setminus S}d_j\). If \(l>k(S)\), then \(x^S_j=0\) for all \(j\in S_l\) and
If \(l<k(T)\), then it holds that \(x^T_j=d_j\) for all \(j\in T_l\). Hence, since \(S_l\subset T_l\),
Since \(S\subset T\), it follows from Lemma 1 that \(k(S)\le k(T)\). Therefore, the only case that remains to be considered is \(l=k(S)=k(T)\). In that case
where the first and fifth equality hold by Theorem 1. \(\square \)
Proof
(Lemma 3) 1: Let \(d_i\ge E\). Then \(D(N_{-i})=0\) and \(v^R(N_{-i})=0\). Therefore,
2: Let \(d_i<E\). Set \(k=k(N)\),
2a: Let \(i\in P_1\). We start by showing that \(k(N_{-i})=k\). By definition of \(k\) we have
Since \(i\in N_1 \cup \dots \cup N_{k-1}\), this implies
Consequently, \(k(N_{-i})=k\). Hence,
and
2b/2c: Let \(i\in P_2\cup P_3\). By Theorem 2 it holds that
while
Then
If \(k(N_{-i})=k\), then this simplifies into
If \(k(N_{-i})<k\), then
This finishes 2b/2c. \(\square \)
Proof
(Theorem 4) Clearly, \(m(v^R)\ge 0\) for an RA-game \(v^R\). Let \(S\in 2^N\setminus \{\emptyset \}\). According to Quant et al. (2005), it suffices to prove that
For \(D(S)=0\) it holds that \(v^R(S)=0\) and inequality (8) is easily verified. Let \(D(S)>0\). This implies that \(v^R(S)>0\) and \(d_i<E\) for all \(i\in N\setminus S\). It remains to prove that
Set \(k=k(N)\). First let \(\{N_l\setminus S_l|l\in \{k,\ldots ,m\}\}=\emptyset \). This tells us that
which implies that \(k(S)=k\). Hence,
Here, the second and last equality follow from Theorem 2 and Lemma 3(2a).
Secondly, let \(\{N_l\setminus S_l|l\in \{k,\ldots ,m\}\}\not =\emptyset \) and assume that \(k(N_{-i})=k\) for all \(i\in \bigcup \limits _{l=k}^{m}(N_l\setminus S_l)\). We will prove inequality (9) by showing
For this,
Here, the first equality follows from Theorem 2 and Lemma 3(2a). The inequality holds because \(\beta _k<\beta _{l}\) for all \(l\in \{k(S),\ldots ,k-1\}\). The last equality follows from the fact that \(M_i(v^R)=\beta _kd_i\) for all \(i\in \bigcup \limits _{l=k}^{m}(N_l\setminus S_l)\).
Thirdly, let \(\{N_l\setminus S_l|l\in \{k,\ldots ,m\}\}\not =\emptyset \) and let agent \(i^*\in \bigcup \limits _{l=k}^{m}(N_l\setminus S_l)\) be such that \(k(N_{-i^*})<k\). Without loss of generality, assume that \(d_{i^*}\ge d_j\) for all \(j\in \bigcup \limits _{l=k}^m(N_l\setminus S_l)\). We will prove (9) by showing
For this, observe that
The first equality follow from Theorem 2 and Lemma 3(2a,2b). The third equality holds by using Lemma 1 such that \(k(N_{-i^*})\ge k(S)\) for \(i^*\in N\setminus S\). The first and second inequality are due to the fact that \(\beta _{k(N_{-i^*})}<\beta _l\) for all \(l\in \{k(S),\ldots ,k(N_{-i^*})-1\}, \beta _{k(N_{-i^*})}>\beta _l\) for all \(l\in \{k(N_{-i^*})+1,\ldots ,k-1\}\), and \(\beta _{k(N_{-i^*})}\ge \beta _{k(N_{-j})}\) for all \(j\in \bigcup _{l=k}^m(N_l\setminus S_l)\). \(\square \)
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Grundel, S., Borm, P. & Hamers, H. Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games. Math Meth Oper Res 78, 149–169 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0437-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0437-6