Abstract
In Nash bargaining problem, due to fairness concerns of players, instead of maximizing the sum of utilities of all players, an implementable solution should satisfy some axioms or characterizations. Such a solution can result in the so-called price of fairness, because of the reduction in the sum of utilities of all players. An important issue is to quantify the system efficiency loss under axiomatic solutions through the price of fairness. Based on Perles–Maschler solution of two-player Nash bargaining problem, this paper deals with the extended Perles–Maschler solution of multi-player Nash bargaining problem. We give lower bounds of three measures of the system efficiency for this solution, and show that the lower bounds are asymptotically tight.


Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bertsimas D, Farias VF, Trichakis N (2011) The price of fairness. Oper Res 59(1):17–31
Bertsimas D, Farias VF, Trichakis N (2012) On the efficiency-fairness trade-off. Manage Sci 58(12):2234–2250
Calvo E, Gutierrez E (1994) Extension of the Perles–Maschler solution to n-person Nash bargaining games. Int J Game Theory 23:325–346
Chang C, Hwang Y-A (1999) A characterization of the leximin solution of the bargaining problem. Math Methods Oper Res 49:395–400
Hinojosa MA, Marmol AM, Monroy L (2005) Generalized Maximin Solutions in Multicriteria Bargaining. Math Methods Oper Res 137:243–255
Imai H (1983) Individual monotonicity and lexicographic maxmin solution. Econometrica 51(2):389–401
Kalai E, Smorodinsky M (1975) Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Econometrica 43(3):513–518
Nash JF (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18(2):155–162
Pallaschke D, Rosenmuller J (2007) A superadditive solution for cephoidal bargaining problems. Int J Game Theory 35:569–590
Perles MA, Maschler M (1981) The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game. Int J Game Theory 10(3):163–193
Perles MA (1982) Non-existence of super-additive solutions for 3-person games. Int J Game Theory 11(3):151–161
Roth AE (1979) Axiomatic models of bargaining. Springer, New York
Salonen H (1985) A solution for two-person bargaining problems. Soc Choice Welf 2:139–146
Thomson W (1994) Cooperative models of bargaining. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Elsevier, North-Holland, pp 1237–1284
Varga RS (2009) Matrix iterative analysis. Springer, Berlin
Acknowledgments
This research has been supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Projects 71031005 and 71210002).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4
For a given \(\mathbf {x}\) satisfying the condition in the theorem, it is clear that \(g^i(\mathbf {x}_{-i}|A)>x_i\) because \(\mathbf {x}\in A\) and \(\mathbf {x} \notin OP (A)\). Consider the following matrix
Then define function \(\bar{\mathbf {g}}(t,\mathbf {k})=(\bar{g}^1(t,\mathbf {k}),\ldots ,\bar{g}^n(t, \mathbf {k}))^T=J_*^{-1}(\mathbf {g}(\mathbf {x}+tJ_*\mathbf {k}|A)-\mathbf {x})\) for \(t\in [0,+\infty )\) and \(\mathbf {k}\in \mathbb {R}_+^n\). (Note that \(\bar{\mathbf {g}}(t,\mathbf {k})\) is well defined for \(\mathbf {x}+tJ_*\mathbf {k}\in A\).)
Since \(\mathbf {d}^\mathbf {x}(\mathbf {h}^*(\mathbf {x}|A)|A)=\lambda ^*(\mathbf {x}|A) \cdot \mathbf {h}^*(\mathbf {x}|A)\), we have
Hence, it holds that
which leads to
where \(\mathbf {k}^*=(k^*_1,\ldots ,k^*_n)^T=J_*^{-1}\cdot \mathbf {h}^*(\mathbf {x}|A)\).
From Theorem 1, \(g^i(\cdot |A)\) is concave in \(A^i\), by which \(\mathbf {e}^T\cdot \mathbf {g}(\mathbf {x}|A)\) is concave for all \(\mathbf {x}\in A\). Therefore, we have, \(\mathbf {e}^T\cdot \bar{\mathbf {g}}(t,\mathbf {k})\) is concave for all \(\mathbf {k}\in \mathbb {R}_+^n\) such that \(\mathbf {x}+tJ_*\mathbf {k}\in A\) (i.e., \(\bar{\mathbf {g}}(t,\mathbf {k})\) is well defined), and \(\mathbf {e}^T\cdot \bar{\mathbf {g}}(t,\mathbf {k})\) is also concave for all \(t\in \mathbb {R}_+\) such that \(\mathbf {x}+tJ_*\mathbf {k}\in A\).
Since \(\mathbf {x} \notin OP (A)\), for sufficient small \(t\), we have \(\mathbf {x}+tJ_*\mathbf {k}^*\in A\) and \(\mathbf {x}+t(\mathbf {e}^TJ_*\mathbf {k}^*)\cdot \mathbf {e}^i\in A, \forall i=1,2,\ldots ,n\). Hence, from (49), together with \(\mathbf {e}^T\cdot \bar{\mathbf {g}}(t,\mathbf {k})\) being concave in \(\mathbf {k}\) if it is well defined, we have
Since the last term in (50) is well defined for all \(t\in (0,(\mathbf {e}^T\cdot \mathbf {k}^*)^{-1}]\), it is known that \(\bar{\mathbf {g}}(t,(\mathbf {e}^T\cdot \mathbf {k}^*)\mathbf {e}^i)\) is concave for \(t\). Hence, we have from (50)
The last equality holds because \(\mathbf {x}+J_*\mathbf {e}^i\in OP (A)\) (hence \(\mathbf {g}(\mathbf {x}+J_*\mathbf {e}^i|A)=\mathbf {x}+J_*\mathbf {e}^i\)) and \(J_*^{-1}(\mathbf {g}(\mathbf {x}|A)-\mathbf {x})=\mathbf {e}^T\). Therefore, we have obtained
Since \(\mathbf {g}(\mathbf {x}|A)\) is decreasing, from (49), it is easy to see \(\lambda ^*(\mathbf {x}|A)\le 0\). Hence, we have proved that \(|\lambda ^*(\mathbf {x}|A)|\le n-1\). \(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 5
Here, we consider the same function \(\mathbf {W}(u|A )\) in Theorem 2. Recall that the EPM solution of \(A\) in Theorem 2 is \(\mathbf {f}_{PM}(A)=\mathbf {\eta }(u_{PM}|A)\). Then, we have already known that it is sufficient to show \(\mathbf {W}(u|A )\) is non-decreasing. However, we are not able to prove \(\mathbf {W}^\prime (u|A )\ge \mathbf {0}^n\) because \(\mathbf {W}(u|A )\) may not be differentiable. Here, we adopt another approach, that is to prove the right-sided derivative of \(\mathbf {W}(u|A )\) is non-negative, i.e., to prove
for all \(u\in [0,u_{PM})\). (In Lemma 1 following this proof, we show that this condition guarantees \(\mathbf {W}(u|A )\) is non-decreasing.)
From Theorem 2, we have
Note that \(\mathbf {\eta }(u|A)\) is strictly increasing, hence \(\mathbf {\eta }_+^\prime (u|A)=\mathbf {h}^*(\mathbf {\eta }(u|A)|A)\ge \mathbf {0}^n\). From \(\mathbf {\eta }_+^\prime (u|A)\ge \mathbf {0}^n\) and \(\mathbf {\eta }_+^\prime (u|A)\ne \mathbf {0}^n\), it follows that
Substituting (55) into (54) leads to
Then, from Theorem 4, it is known that \(\mathbf {W}_+^\prime (u|A )\ge \mathbf {0}^n\), which completes the proof. \(\square \)
Lemma 1
If \(f:[a,b)\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) is a continuous function, and \(f_+^\prime (x)\ge 0\) for all \(x\in [a,b)\), then \(f\) is increasing in \([a,b)\).
Proof
Consider \(\overline{f}(x)=f(x)+\varepsilon x\) for \(x\in [a,b)\) and \(\varepsilon >0\). Then, \(\overline{f}_+^\prime (x)\ge \varepsilon \). We first show that \(\overline{f}\) is increasing in \([a,b)\).
If \(\overline{f}\) is not increasing in \([a,b)\), then there are \(c\in [a,b)\) and \(d\in [a,b)\) such that \(c<d\) and \(\overline{f}(c)>\overline{f}(d)\). The continuity of \(\overline{f}(x)\) in \([c,d]\) implies that there exists \(\theta \in [c,d]\) such that \(\overline{f}(\theta )=\sup _{x\in [c,d]}\overline{f}(x)\). Since \(\overline{f}(c)>\overline{f}(d)\), we have \(\theta \ne d\), hence \(\varepsilon \le \overline{f}_+^\prime (\theta )=\lim _{t>0,t\rightarrow 0}\frac{\overline{f}(\theta +t)-\overline{f}(\theta )}{t}\le 0\), which is in contradiction with \(\varepsilon >0\)! This means that \(\overline{f}\) is increasing in \([a,b)\).
From the increasing property of \(\overline{f}\) in \([a,b), \forall a\le c\le d<b\), we have \(\overline{f}(d)\ge \overline{f}(c)\), i.e., \(f(d)\ge f(c)+\varepsilon (c-d)\). Let \(\varepsilon \rightarrow 0\), it follows that \(f(d)\ge f(c)\). This means that \(f\) is increasing in \([a,b)\). \(\square \)
1.1 Calculation of the examples
We need to show that \(A(t,s)\in P_0^*\), i.e., \(A(t,s)\) satisfies Assumptions 1, 2 and \( OP (A(t,s))\) being the union of pieces of hyper-planes. It is easy to see from the definition of \(A(t,s)\) that \(A(t,s)\) is convex, compact, comprehensive and \( OP (A(t,s))\) is the union of pieces of hyper-planes. Hence, we only need to verify that \(A(t,s)\) satisfies Assumption 2. According to the definition of \(A(t,s), \forall \mathbf {x}\in A(t,s)\), we have
And \(\forall k=2,\ldots ,n\),
It is easy to see that \(g^k(\mathbf {0}^{n-1}|A(t,s))=q^k\) and \(g^k(\cdot |A(t,s))\) is continuous and strictly decreasing, \(\forall k=1,\ldots ,n\). For any given \(k\in \{1,\ldots ,n\}\), we show that \(\mathbf {x}\in OP (A(t,s))\Longleftrightarrow x_k=g^k (\mathbf {x}_{-k}|A(t,s) )\).
If \(\mathbf {x}\in OP (A(t,s))\), then \(p_1 (\mathbf {x}|t)\le 1,p_i (\mathbf {x}|s)\le 1,i=2,\ldots ,n\), and at least one of them is equality, which implies \(x_k=g^k (\mathbf {x}_{-k}|A(t,s) )\).
If \(x_k=g^k (\mathbf {x}_{-k}|A(t,s) )\), then \(p_1 (\mathbf {x}|t)\le 1,p_i (\mathbf {x}|s)\le 1,i=2,\ldots ,n\), and at least one of them is with equality. Assume \(p_l (\mathbf {x}|r)=1\) where \(1\le l\le n\) and \(r\in \{s,t\} \). If \(\mathbf {x} \notin OP (A(t,s))\), then \(\exists \mathbf {y}\in A(t,s)\) such that \(\mathbf {y}\ge \mathbf {x}\) and \(\mathbf {y}\ne \mathbf {x}\). Since each coefficient in \(p_l (\cdot |r)\) is strictly positive, we have \(p_l (\mathbf {y}|r)>1\), which leads to a contradiction with \( \mathbf {y}\in A(t,s)\). Hence, \(\mathbf {x}\in OP (A(t,s))\).
Therefore, \(A(t,s)\) satisfies Assumption 2, which implies \(A(t,s)\in P_0^*\). Since \(g^k(\mathbf {0}^{n-1}|A(t,s))=q^k\) for \(k=1,\ldots ,n\), it is known that the maximum achievable profit for the \(k\)th player is \(q^k\).
A two dimensional example of \(A(t,s)\) is shown in Fig. 3. Since \( OP (A(t,s))\) is the union of pieces of hyper-planes, we know that \(g^i(\cdot |A(t,s))\) is piecewise linear in \(A^i(s,t)\). Therefore, \(\mathbf {G}(\mathbf {x}|A(t,s))=\partial \mathbf {g}(\mathbf {x}|A(t,s))/\partial \mathbf {x}\) is a piecewise constant matrix in \(A(t,s)\) (i.e., \(\mathbf {G}(\mathbf {x}|A(t,s))\) is a constant matrix in each piece of \(A(t,s)\)). Hence, the tangent vector \(\mathbf {h}^*(\mathbf {x}|A(t,s))\) of \(C(A(t,s))\) is a piecewise constant vector, which indicates that \(C(A(t,s))\) is piecewise linear. Because \(C(A(t,s))\) is piecewise linear, finding the points on the PM path of \(A(t,s)\) which are not differentiable is enough to determine the PM path \(C(A(t,s))\).
Since \(C(A(t,s))\) starts from \(\mathbf {0}^n\), we need to calculate \(\mathbf {G}(\mathbf {0}^n|A(t,s) )\) and \(\mathbf {h}(\mathbf {0}^n|A(t,s) )\). Note that in a small local area of \(\mathbf {0}^n\), it follows that
Hence
where
Then, the PM path \(C(A(t,s))\) starts from \(\mathbf {0}^n\) and moves along the direction \(\mathbf {h}(\mathbf {0}^n|A(t,s) )\) until reaching the point \(\mathbf {y}\) where \(g^i(\cdot |A(t,s) )\) is not differentiable at \(\mathbf {y}_{-i}\) for \(i\in \{2,\ldots ,n\}\). Then, \(\mathbf {y}\) satisfies that \(\forall i\in \{2,\ldots ,n\}, (\mathbf {y}_{-i}: g^i (\mathbf {y_{-i}}|A(t,s) ))\) is in the intersection of two hyper-planes \(p_1 (\mathbf {x}|t)=1\) and \(p_i (\mathbf {x}|s)=1\). Consequently, we have
where
For any \(\mathbf {x}\in A(t,s)\) and \(\mathbf {x}>\mathbf {y}\), we have
The above leads to
Then, the PM path starts again from \(\mathbf {y}\) and moves along the direction \(\mathbf {h}(\mathbf {x}|A(t,s) )\) until reaching the EPM solution \(\mathbf {f_{PM}}(A(t,s))\) in the hyper-plane \(p_1 (\mathbf {x}|t)=1\). Hence,
where
So far, we have found the EPM solution \(\mathbf {f_{PM}}(A(t,s))\). Next, we estimate the system efficiency.
Assume that \(\mathbf {z}\) is the intersection of the hyper-planes \(p_1 (\mathbf {x}|t)=1\) and \(p_i (\mathbf {x}|s)=1\) for all \(i=2,\ldots ,n\). Then, we have
Let \(s\rightarrow 0\), we have \(\epsilon \rightarrow 0, b\rightarrow 1-t\) and \(c\rightarrow t/n \), then let \(t\rightarrow 0\) we have \(\mathbf {f_{PM}}(A(t,s))\rightarrow (q^1,q^2/n,\ldots ,q^n/n)\) and \(\mathbf {z}\rightarrow (q^1,q^2,\ldots ,q^n)\).
Therefore, we have the following inequalities
and
Together with Theorem 6, we know that the above inequalities become equalities, hence the bounds given in Theorem 6 are asymptotically tight.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zhong, F., Xie, J. & Zhao, X. The price of fairness with the extended Perles–Maschler solution. Math Meth Oper Res 80, 193–212 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-014-0475-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-014-0475-8