Abstract.
The paper presents the bargaining model in which preferences of each player are expressed by the sequence of bargaining costs varying in time. There are theorems describing subgame perfect equilibria for some models with the bargaining costs varying in time. In the class of strategies independent of the former history, a delay in reaching an agreement of subgame perfect equilibrium is impossible. However, if strategies depend on the former history of the game, then an agreement can be reached with delay. An adequate example in which a delay appears is presented.
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Manuscript received: December 2001/Final version received: April 2002
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ID="*" The author currently holds a Marie Curie Fellowship at Tilburg University
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Rusinowska, A. Subgame perfect equilibria in model with bargaining costs varying in time. Mathematical Methods of OR 56, 303–313 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860200219
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860200219