Abstract.
Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
We wish to thank Enriqueta Aragones, Jean-Francois Laslier, Andrew Postlewaite, and David Schmeidler for the comments and discussions. We thank Lada Burde for her help in proofreading.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gilboa, I., Vieille, N. Majority vote following a debate. Soc Choice Welfare 23, 115–125 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9