Abstract.
Rawls (1971, 1993) suggests that a primary goods index should be the basis for interpersonal comparisons in a theory of justice, but it is well known that in general this approach is not compatible with the Pareto principle. This is the indexing impasse. Sen (1985, 1991) argues that this is partly due to the fact that the approach does not take note of the citizen’s orderings of these bundles of valuable objects. He suggests an “intersection approach”, which is an incomplete approach to interpersonal comparisons based on judgements that are shared implications of the relevant set of weighting schemes. In this paper, we show that “the intersection approach” does not provide any solution to the indexing impasse. Unless the individuals have identical preferences, “the intersection approach” is incompatible with the Pareto principle.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This paper originates from the second chapter of Brun (1998). An earlier version was presented at a conference on Non Welfaristic Issues in Normative Economics at the University of Caen in June 1999, and we should like to thank the participants at the conference for their discussion of the paper. Moreover, we are grateful to Geir B.␣Asheim, Alexander Cappelen, Kåre P. Hagen, Aanund Hylland, Marc Fleurbaey, John Roemer, Eivind Stensholt, Gaute Torsvik, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Brun, B., Tungodden, B. Non-welfaristic theories of justice: Is “the intersection approach” a solution to the indexing impasse?. Soc Choice Welfare 22, 49–60 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0276-0
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0276-0