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Rights as alternative game forms

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Abstract.

The paper analyzes the problem of modeling rights using extensive game forms with perfect information. Three dimensions of rights – protocol, autonomy and power – are identified and it is shown, that under a certain condition, the effectivity function captures completely all rights relevant aspects of a game form. The condition under which this is possible is interpretable both as a particular formulation of individual liberty and as a rejection of consequentialism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX, 75275, USA

    Rajat Deb

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  1. Rajat Deb
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Correspondence to Rajat Deb.

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I wish to express my debt to Professor A.K. Sen and P.K. Pattanaik for several helpful discussions on rights as game forms. I also wish to thank professors N. Balke, M. Dasgupta, M. Davis, J. Hadar, A. Sengupta, and W.M. Thomson for their comments.

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Deb, R. Rights as alternative game forms. Soc Choice Welfare 22, 83–111 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0278-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0278-y

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