Abstract
Pufendorf's major work on “The Law of Nature and of Nations” has never been considered to have had much influence on economics and on the development of economics as a science. The present paper by no means attempts to propagate a different view. This would be inappropriate. However, what Pufendorf says about the importance of contracts among the members of a community and the formation of supreme sovereignty is highly relevant for the social sciences. But not only this. Economists will, perhaps, be surprised to read something about externalities and future discounting in Pufendorf's work. Also the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption was clearly described. Most stunning for social choice theorists probably will be that Pufendorf more or less explicitly discussed a preference structure that was single-peaked along a single dimension. And the collective result proposed conforms to that of the median voter.
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Notes
This paper uses an English translation of Pufendorf's work, provided by C.H. and W.A. Oldfather in 1934. Their translation is based on an edition of Pufendorf's treatise from 1688. A translation into German of the first two books of Pufendorf's work was prepared by Immanuel Weber toward the end of the 17th century. A translation into French by Jean de Barbeyrac, together with a longer introduction and numerous annotations appeared in 1706. Barbeyrac's translation became very influential in France. A translation of Pufendorf's opus into English by Kennet appeared in 1716. A bit later, there were also translations into Italian and Russian.
“For the wickedness of man's character and his proneness to injure others can in no way be restrained more effectively than by thrusting in his face the immediate evil which will await him upon his attacking another, and by removing every hope of impunity” (De Jure Naturae et Gentium (henceforth abbreviated as DJN), Libri Octo, 1672, p. 967). This rather blunt description of man's character reappears at various instances in DJN, but also in some of Pufendorf's other work. In De Officio Hominis (1673), for example, when comparing man with the beasts, Pufendorf wrote: “Many other passions and desires are found in the human race unknown to the beasts, as, greed for unnecessary possessions, avarice, desire of glory and surpassing others, envy, rivalry and intellectual strife. It is indicative that many of the wars by which the human race is broken and bruised, are waged for reasons unknown to the beasts” (book I, chapt. 3.4, p. 34, quoted in Hunter (2001, p. 171)). And he continued: “Man, then, is an animal with an intense concern for his own preservation, needy by himself, incapable of protection without the help of his fellows, and very well fitted for the mutual provision of benefits. Equally, however, he is at the same time malicious, aggressive, easily provoked and as willing as he is able to inflict harm on others” (De Officio Hominis, book I, chapt. 3.7, p. 35, again quoted in Hunter (2001, p. 171)).
From now on, page numbers refer to Pufendorf's De jure naturae et gentium, unless otherwise stated.
Pufendorf did not believe in an actual or ideal union of wills or, as we would say in social choice theory, in an effective way of aggregating preferences. “... A union of wills cannot possibly be encompassed by the wills of all being naturally lumped into one, or by only one person willing, and all the rest ceasing to do so, or by removing in some way the natural variation of wills and their tendency to oppose each other, and combining them into an abiding harmony” (p. 972). This union is rather the outcome of an agreement among individuals to strive for common security and safety. So they subordinate their will to that of one man or of a single council, and the man's or the council's decree has to be regarded as the will of each and every person. However, the members of the civil society only resign rights conditionally. Should the civil power violate terms of the agreement or contract, the citizens can resume their rights.
Pufendorf mentioned the Egyptians who did not permit the papyrus plant to grow in too many places and the Dutch who destroyed the clove and nutmeg plants in various parts of India in order to prevent an over-supply.
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Most of this research was done at STICERD, London School of Economics. My gratitude goes to the Institute for its generous hospitality. Helpful suggestions by Maurice Salles, Pat Suppes and Wulf Eckart Voß are also gratefully acknowledged.
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Gaertner, W. De jure naturae et gentium: Samuel von Pufendorf's contribution to social choice theory and economics. Soc Choice Welfare 25, 231–241 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0002-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0002-1