Abstract
If an anonymous rule f always outputs a transitive relation and satisfies Pareto, then, by Arrow’s theorem, f violates the condition of independence. We give lower and upper bounds for the number of times an anonymous rule violates independence in the case of three alternatives and three voters.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York
Brualdi RA (1977) Introductory combinatorics. Elsevier North-Holland, New York
Campbell DE (1992) Equity, efficiency, and social choice. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Campbell DE, Kelly JS (1995) Nondictatorially independent pairs. Soc Choice and Welfare 12:75–86
Powers RC (2001) Nondictatorially independent pairs and Pareto. Soc Choice and Welfare 18:75–86
Van Deemen A (1999) The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings. Soc Choice and Welfare 16:171–182
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Powers, R.C. The Number of Times an Anonymous Rule Violates Independence in the 3 × 3 Case. Soc Choice Welfare 28, 363–373 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0172-5
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0172-5