Abstract
When a single group uses majority rule to select a set of policies from an n-dimensional compact and convex set, a core generally exists if and only if n = 1. Finding analogous conditions for core existence when an n-dimensional action requires agreement from m groups has been an open problem. This paper provides a solution to this problem by establishing sufficient conditions for core existence and characterizing the location and dimensionality of the core for settings in which voters have Euclidean preferences. The conditions establish that a core may exist in any number of dimensions whenever n ≤ m as long as there is sufficient preference homogeneity within groups and heterogeneity between groups. With m > 1 the core is however generically empty for \({n > \frac{4m-2}{3}}\). These results provide a generalization of the median voter theorem and of non-existence results for contexts of concern to students of multiparty negotiation, comparative politics and international relations.
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Humphreys, M. Existence of a multicameral core. Soc Choice Welfare 31, 503–520 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0293-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0293-5