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Networks and outside options

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Abstract

We introduce and characterize a component efficient value for TU games with a cooperation structure which in contrast to the Myerson (Math Oper Res 2:225–229, 1977) value accounts for outside options. It is based on the idea that the distribution of the worth within a component should be consistent with some connected graph which reflects the outside options of the component’s players.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Professur für Mikroökonomik, Universität Leipzig, PF 100920, 04009, Leipzig, Germany

    André Casajus

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  1. André Casajus
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Correspondence to André Casajus.

Additional information

I wish to thank Lothar Tröger, Andreas Tutic, and seminar participants at the Leipzig Graduate School of Management (HHL), Germany for helpful comments on this paper. The exposition of the ideas in this paper benefited from remarks of an associate editor and of two anonymous referees.

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Casajus, A. Networks and outside options. Soc Choice Welf 32, 1–13 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0305-0

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