Abstract
We deal with a fair division model concerning compensation among individuals endowed with different, non transferable, personal talents. We construct social orderings over all conceivable allocations based on efficiency, fairness, and robustness properties. Relying on orderings gives us the possibility of deriving the appropriate public policy even if incentive constraints arise.
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Valletta, G. A fair solution to the compensation problem. Soc Choice Welf 32, 455–478 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0335-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0335-7