Abstract
We examine the possibility of Arrovian social choice when alternatives consist of outcomes and opportunity sets from which they are chosen. Consequentialism is a choice attitude towards outcomes and opportunities for choice and prioritizes outcomes rather than opportunities for choice. We first propose a sufficient condition for a restricted domain on which Arrow’s impossibility theorem holds. A domain such that there exists a similarity of choice attitudes within consequentialism satisfies the proposed domain condition. We observe that a diversity of choice attitudes within consequentialism is crucial to resolve an Arrovian impossibility, but this resolution is restricted in plausibility.
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Iwata, Y. Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains. Soc Choice Welf 32, 513–531 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0338-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0338-4