Abstract
In this paper, we reconsider the full characterization of two-agent Nash implementation provided in the celebrated papers by Moore and Repullo (Econometrica 58:1083–1099, 1990) and Dutta and Sen (Rev Econ Stud 58:121–128, 1991), since we are able to show that the characterizing conditions are not logically independent. We prove that an amended version of the conditions proposed in these papers is still necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability. Then, by using our necessary and sufficient condition, we show that Maskin’s impossibility result can be avoided under restrictions on the outcomes and the domain of preferences much weaker than those previously imposed by Moore and Repullo (Econometrica 58:1083–1099, 1990) and Dutta and Sen (Rev Econ Stud 58:121–128, 1991).
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References
Dutta B, Sen A (1991) A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation. Rev Econ Stud 58: 121–128
Maskin E (1999) Nash implementation and welfare optimality. Rev Econ Stud 66: 23–38
Moore J, Repullo R (1990) Nash implementation: a full characterization. Econometrica 58: 1083–1099
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Busetto, F., Codognato, G. Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation. Soc Choice Welf 32, 171–179 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0355-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0355-3