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Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan

    Susumu Cato

  2. Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan

    Daisuke Hirata

Authors
  1. Susumu Cato
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  2. Daisuke Hirata
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Correspondence to Susumu Cato.

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Cato, S., Hirata, D. Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations. Soc Choice Welf 34, 611–630 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0420-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0420-6

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