Abstract
The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of the whole population since voters can abstain. This paper shows that although the quorum can be set such that the outcome of the referendum coincides with the population preference, the necessary assumptions make practical implementation unrealistic. Moreover, a second equilibrium can exist in which the proposal is always rejected. When insufficient information makes the optimal quorum unknown, it is in general more harmful to set the quorum too high than too low. Robustness of the results is analyzed by allowing pressure groups to encourage or discourage participation after the quorum is set.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aşan G, Sanver MR (2002) Another characterization of the majority rule. Econ Lett 75(3): 409–413
Ashworth J, Geys B, Heyndels B (2006) Everyone likes a winner: an empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting. Public Choice 128(3–4): 383–405
Bartels LM (1988) Presidential primaries and the dynamics of public choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Blais A (2000) To vote or not to vote. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh
Blais A, Young R, Lapp M (2000) The calculus of voting: an empirical test. Eur J Political Res 37: 181–201
Clausen AR (1968) Response validity: vote report. Public Opin Q 32(4): 588–606
Côrte-Real PP, Pereira PT (2004) The voter who wasn’t there: referenda, representation and abstention. Soc Choice Welf 22: 349–369
Downs A (1957) An economic theory of democracy. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh
Feddersen TJ (2004) Rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting. J Econ Perspectives 18(1): 99–112
Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1997) Ternary voting games. Int J Game Theory 26: 335–351
Fishburn P, Brams S (1983) Paradoxes of preferential voting. Math Mag 56: 207–214
Fort R, Bunn DN (1998) Whether one votes and how one votes. Public Choice 95(1–2): 51–62
Franklin MN (1999) Electoral engineering and cross-national turnout differences: what role for compulsory voting?. Br J Political Sci 29(1): 205–216
Haan MA, Kooreman P (2003) How majorities can lose the election. Another voting paradox. Soc Choice Welf 20: 509–522
Hanafin P (2006) Gender, citizenship and human reproduction in contemporary Italy. Fem Legal Stud 14: 329–352
Herrera H, Mattozzi A (2009) Quorum and turnout in referenda. J Eur Econ Assoc (in press)
Jakee K, Sun G-Z (2006) Is compulsory voting more democratic?. Public Choice 129(1–2): 61–75
Judd KL (1985) The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables. J Econ Theory 35: 19–25
Kanazawa S (1998) A possible solution to the paradox of voter turnout. J Politics 60(4): 974–995
Levine DK, Palfrey TR (2007) The paradox of voter participation? A laboratory study. Am Political Sci Rev 101(1): 143–158
Marquette JF, Hinckley KA (1988) Voter turnout and candidate choice: a merged theory. Political Behav 10(1): 52–76
Matsusaka JG (2005) The eclipse of legislatures: direct democracy in the 21st century. Public Choice 124(1–2): 157–177
May KO (1952) A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority voting. Econometrica 20(4): 680–684
Myatt DP (2007) On the theory of strategic voting. Rev Econ Stud 74(1): 255–281
Myerson RB (2000) Large poisson games. J Econ Theory 94(1): 7–45
Neijens P, van Praag P (2006) The dynamics of opinion formation in local popular referendums: why the Dutch always say no. Int J Public Opin Res 18(4): 445–462
Nurmi H (1998) Voting paradoxes and referenda. Soc Choice Welf 15(3): 333–350
Riker W, Ordeshook P (1968) A theory of the calculus of voting. Am Political Sci Rev 62: 25–42
Rosema M (2004) The sincere vote. A psychological study of voting. PhD thesis, University of Leiden
Schuessler AA (2000) Expressive voting. Ration Soc 12(1): 87–119
The Economist (2007) A painful choice. February 10
The Initiative and Referendum Institute, Web sites. www.iandrinstitute.org and www.iri-europe.org
The New York Times (2005) Vote on fertility law fires passions in Italy. June 11
Waters MD (2003) Initiative and referendum almanac. Carolina Academic Press, Durham
Woeginger GJ (2003) A new characterization of the majority rule. Econ Lett 81(1): 89–94
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zwart, S. Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right. Soc Choice Welf 34, 643–677 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0422-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0422-4